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ABSTRACT
In my first essay I use data from licensed child care centers in the state of Arkansas to
examine the relationship between quality and price charged. To measure quality, I use
Arkansas’s Better Beginnings Quality Rating and Improvement System, a tier-structured
voluntary certification program which can be viewed as a voluntary increase in regulations for
licensed child care centers which allows them to send an observable signal of quality to
consumers. Using an hedonic pricing estimation with controls for varying geographic markets,
results indicate firms with Better Beginnings classification charge higher prices once the highest
levels of certification are obtained. The results provide support for policy in favor of greater
reporting or release of information regarding child care characteristics, especially those
associated with higher quality care, which allow child care facilities to make their quality known
in a way that is easily observable.
My second essay seeks to answer the question: Why do some divorcing couples use the
courts to settle child custody disputes? Settlement literature predicts that cases should settle
efficiently and avoid court costs under symmetric information. Shavell (1993) proposes that
settlement failure occurs when the resource under dispute is indivisible and the value placed on it
is so high that wealth constraints are binding. These characteristics are present in child custody
disputes. In these cases, sharing children through joint custody may be impractical because
parents are not able or willing to share. The paper uses the Stanford Child Custody data set to
empirically analyze how indivisibility may lead to settlement failure in child custody disputes
using variables such as distance between the divorced parents’ households, levels of hostility,
and differences in custody type filed. Other variables included in the analysis are income, home
ownership, involvement levels of each parent with the children, number of children, each

parent’s desire to settle the divorce case outside of the courts, and the use of lawyers. Results
show that parents who file for different types of physical custody and couples that display high
levels of hostility are more likely to end up in court.
My final essay examines the hypothesis that divorcing couples make trade-offs between
child custody and child support in order to secure their preferred custody outcome. Mnookin and
Kornhauser (1979) introduce the concept of “bargaining in the shadow of the law” which
describes negotiations made between parents in the framework of their existing legal setting.
Using data from the Stanford Child Custody Study, I test to see if parents, specifically mothers,
accept lower amounts of child support in order to receive sole physical custody of their children.
Using a two-stage estimation approach to account for the joint determination of child custody
and child support, I find that the legal environment surrounding divorce proceedings, including
aspects such as mandatory mediation along with a preference of the courts for joint custody,
significantly increases the likelihood of joint physical custody. Results from the estimation of
the child support equation suggest that along with the typical guideline variables such as income
of the parents, number of children, and visitation, the time between separation and filing for
divorce and the mother filing for divorce significantly decrease the support award while lawyer
representation of the mother significantly increases the amount of child support issued. Using a
selection model, I find that the significant negative relationship between the custody and support
equations, accounted for in the selection term, signifies that mothers who “win” their preferred
custody are accepting lower amounts of child support.
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INTRODUCTION
The three essays of my dissertation investigate topics in the areas of Applied
Microeconomics and the Economics of the Family. The first analyzes the effect of the Arkansas
Better Beginnings Quality Rating and Improvement System on child care pricing. The second
and third essays use data from the Stanford Child Custody Study to examine divorce cases with a
particular focus on outcomes pertaining to the children. The second essay focuses on aspects of
divorce between couples with children that contribute to their probability of using the court
system to settle disputes. The third paper examines the trade-offs between child custody and
child support that take place when parents bargain for their preferred custody outcome in divorce
disputes.
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CHAPTER I

The Effect of the Arkansas Better Beginnings Quality Rating and Improvement System
on Child Care Pricing

ABSTRACT
I use data from licensed child care centers in the state of Arkansas to examine the
relationship between quality and price charged. To measure quality, I use Arkansas’s Better
Beginnings Quality Rating and Improvement System, a tier-structured voluntary certification
program which can be viewed as a voluntary increase in regulations for licensed child care
centers which allows them to send an observable signal of quality to consumers. Using an
hedonic pricing estimation with controls for varying geographic markets, results indicate firms
with Better Beginnings classification charge higher prices once the highest levels of certification
are obtained. The results provide support for policy in favor of greater reporting or release of
information regarding child care characteristics, especially those associated with higher quality
care, which allow child care facilities to make their quality know in a way that is easily
observable.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2010, almost 11 million children under the age of five had mothers in the workforce.
Of these 11 million children, 24% were in an organized child care facility such as a day care
center, nursery school, preschool, or Federal Head Start Program, and a little over 46% of those
families were making child care payments. At this time, the average weekly child care
expenditures of families with employed mothers was $171 a week for children under five years
old, accounting for about 22.1% of the mother’s monthly income or 10% of the family’s monthly
income. For families below the poverty level, childcare expenses account for 60.9% of the
mother’s monthly income or 40.7% of the family’s monthly income (U.S. Census Bureau).
Clearly the topic of childcare and childcare pricing is important and economists have not
adequately studied quality or how consumers gather and interpret information on quality. For
this paper, I will focus only on Arkansas primarily due to data availability concerning the Quality
Rating and Improvement System. As of 2010, about half of the states have a Quality Rating and
Improvement System and nearly every other state is planning or has already begun developing a
child care quality assessment program. The Quality Rating and Improvement System gives
parents’ information about quality based on the state’s quality ranking system and creates a
differentiated product with various levels of quality.
In 2010, Arkansas’s state Child Care and Development Fund expenditures were almost
twenty-one million dollars (US Department of Health and Human Services, 2010). In an effort
to increase the quality of child care in the state, Arkansas implemented the Better Beginnings
Quality Rating and Improvement system. The voluntary program creates an opportunity for
child care facilities to send a signal that provides observed and verified quality information to
parents in need of child care services. Arkansas provides financial incentives such as grants,
3

bonuses, and awards to assist child care facilities in meeting licensing requirements and in
achieving higher levels of quality. Grant expenditures may include cost for staff/substitutes
during training, management software, curriculum materials, supplies and equipment, and
developmental screenings/assessment materials. In 2010, Arkansas’s Better Beginnings Quality
Rating and Improvement System awarded $410,000 in grants to help child care facilities train
their staff in efforts to improve the quality of childcare (Arkansas Department of Human
Services, 2011). With the increased focus on child care by the state of Arkansas, it is necessary
to examine the effects of the Better Beginnings Program on market outcomes such as the price
and accessibility of quality care.
The Better Beginnings requirements can be viewed as a voluntary increase in firmspecific regulations; specifically, these include an increase in staff training, communication
between child care providers and parents, and management. I have not come across research
associated with the effects of voluntary increases in regulations in the child care market. Given
the assumption that it costs more to produce higher quality care, providers would not have an
incentive to increase the quality of their services if they cannot charge higher fees. If parents
cannot distinguish between high-quality and low-quality centers, they would gravitate to lower
priced child care. Under this scenario, high quality centers exit the market, average quality falls,
and eventually the market is filled primarily with child care facilities that provide mediocre
quality. The hypothesis is that facilities engaged in the Better Beginnings Quality Rating and
Improvement System will charge higher prices due to the increased costs incurred by reaching
the certification requirements and providing higher quality child care.
If in fact results do not indicate higher prices for those facilities that are Better
Beginnings certified, several alternative explanations exist. One is that the training and
4

development grants provided by the state may offset the increased cost associated with the
production of higher quality child care. Another possible explanation is that facilities entering
the Better Beginnings certification process are already meeting the stricter requirements and will
not experience an increase in child care production costs. In other words, the Better Beginnings
regulations may not be binding for those facilities selecting into the process.
This paper will provide an in depth examination of childcare prices in Arkansas and show
the impact of the Better Beginnings Quality Rating System on child care prices. I use data from
the state of Arkansas to examine how the characteristics of child care influence the price centers
charge, specifically focusing on the relationship between quality and price charged by licensed
child care centers. To measure quality, I use Arkansas’s Better Beginnings Quality Rating and
Improvement System, a tier-structured voluntary certification program, which can be viewed as a
voluntary increase in regulations for licensed child care centers. Using an hedonic pricing
estimation with controls for varying geographic markets, results indicate firms with Better
Beginnings classification charge higher prices once the highest levels of certification are
obtained. The results provide support for policy in favor of greater reporting or release of
information regarding child care characteristics, especially those associated with higher quality
care, which allow child care facilities to make their quality know in a way that is easily
observable.
The paper adds to the current literature by examining voluntary increases in child care
regulations as opposed to state mandated rules with a particular focus on consumer information
due to the availability of a signal of quality provided by the Quality Rating and Improvement
System. A disconnect exists in the literature between the quality of child care services and price
indicating consumers cannot accurately assess the level of quality being provided. This paper
5

investigates if a system, such as the Quality Rating and Improvement System, can improve the
availability of information to parents and subsequently improve the quality of care available.
Moreover, the paper applies a multi-product approach by separating child care analysis by the
various age groups rather than lumping all prices together. Finally, a novel dataset of a local
market is used as opposed to a national sample in order to better capture the competitive
environment of the child care market. The types of regulations analyzed in this paper are
voluntary in that the more stringent components of care are not mandatory. The requirements are
above and beyond those of the regulations mandated by the state. The Quality Rating and
Improvement System program, the organization responsible for implementing and reporting the
level of care is new and no research to my knowledge has examined this type of voluntary
change in behavior for child care providers. These programs give the child care facilities an
incentive for increasing the quality of care they provide by creating a reporting system that
passes information along to consumers and educates them about the characteristics of care they
should be emphasizing when looking for quality child care.
Another primary difference in my paper is the observability of the level of care provided
by a child care facility. The most important element of the QRIS is the availability of
information. A main focus of this paper is the relationship between the Better Beginnings Level,
Arkansas’s QRIS, and the price charged by the child care facilities. The link between higher
quality and higher price has not been consistently found in the literature possibly due to parents
inability to accurately assess high quality childcare. I hypothesize that the information
component of the QRIS, which has not been discussed in the literature, is the source of the
different price effect I find. Each age group is classified as a different product because pricing
information is separated into these categories indicative of the fact that each age category
6

requires a different amount or type of care. Also, the pricing data is reported by age group and
because I do not have classroom-specific characteristics, analyzing the prices charged for each
age group separately is the best way to not entangle the results and pricing strategies of the child
care facility. The paper also uses a novel unique dataset that captures competition in local
markets. These contributions are timely given the recent emphasis on quality child care at both
the state and national scale.
In Section II, I will provide an in depth review of literature concerning various topics in
the child care market such as work discussing the demand for child care, the effects of
regulations on outcomes, and the cost-quality relationships for child care facilities. I will
describe a model of firm behavior in Section III then discuss the data in Section IV. I will
present the econometric model in Section V. In Section VI, I will present the results. Section
VII will conclude and discuss avenues of further research.

LITERATURE REVIEW
Economists have studied the child care market in great depth, analyzing the demand for
quality, choice of care type, the dynamics of the child care labor market, employment decisions
of mothers, the relationship between quality and price, effect of subsidies and regulations on
market outcomes, and the supply of quality. When examining the relationship between quality
and price, researchers have not been able to find a strong consistent relationship. Arguments
suggest parents do not include the same variables of quality such as child-to-staff ratio, teacher
training, and group size, as those measured by early childhood researchers and instead place a
greater value on characteristics of care such as convenience. Another explanation for the lack of
relationship between the price paid by parents for child care and the quality of care is that parents
7

are not well-informed about the care their child is receiving due to the difficulty of monitoring
(Cryer & Burchinal, 1997). Macon tests for adverse selection and claims that the low average
quality of care may be due to information asymmetry between parents and the providers of care
because parents are not the direct consumers of the services (Mocan, 2007). Due to the
information asymmetry and the lack of ability of parents to accurately measure quality in child
care services, parents cannot accurately assess high quality childcare; therefore, price does not
directly indicate quality in the child care market.
Waite, Leibowitz, and Witsberger (1991) use parent reported data from the NLSY 1985
to estimate how much parents are willing to pay for each characteristic of child care. The
hypothesis is that parents would be willing to pay more for characteristics typically associated
with higher quality of care such as child to staff ratio. An hedonic price function was used to
analyze the impact of each characteristic of care on the price parents reported paying for child
care. Results indicate that parents do not pay more for characteristics associated with high
quality child care as defined by child development specialist. Implications of these findings
suggest that parents may place greater value on other characteristics of care such as convenience
or the relationship with the child care provider. (Waite, Leibowitz, & Witsberger, 1991). Similar
results are found in Blau and Mocan (1999). The paper provides a detailed theoretical
framework of the quality production function along with the firms profit, cost, and quality supply
functions. Price functions are also estimated using classroom level data from the Cost, Quality,
and Outcome Study. They find that parents are unwilling to pay more for higher quality child
care and regulations have almost no impact on average child care quality (Blau & Mocan, 1999).
The majority of the literature on child care has analyzed the demand for quality in child
care. Hagy (1998) uses an hedonic price theory approach to estimate the implicit price of child8

to-staff ratio as a first step in estimating the demand for quality. A detailed description of the
theoretical framework of consumer utility maximization is presented along with the explanation
of the hedonic price literature (Epple, 1997; Bartik, 1987; Rosen, 1974). Hagy (1998) uses data
from the 1990 National Child Care Survey for family characteristics and the Profile of Child
Care Setting Study for child care provider settings. The datasets were matched based on
geographic areas. Results suggest that the quality of care, mother’s wage rate, spouse’s
earnings, and the implicit price of quality impact the demand for quality child care. Blau and
Hagy (1998) use the same dataset to estimate the demand for group size, staff to child ratio and
provider training. They also estimate models about choice of care and find that as price
decreases there is an increase in the use of that care in terms of hours of child care purchased and
an increase in the number of hours employed by mothers. Both papers suggest that subsidies will
have no effect on the demand for quality due to the lack of relationship between quality-adjusted
price and quality of care. Contrary to Blau and Hagy (1998), Ryan et al. (2011) show that
families that receive subsidies are more likely to receive higher care due to the fact that those
receiving subsidies choose to put their children in center based care.
A main section of the literature analyzed the choice of child care type, such as child care
center, child care family home, or relative care. When studying child care outcomes, one must
consider family selection criteria because family characteristics influence the choice of care.
Families with higher incomes choose higher quality care and are more likely to have children in
child care centers relative to low-income families (Burchinal & Nelson, 2000). Hofferth and
Wissoker (1992) examine the impact of federal assistance efforts, such as vouchers or grants,
regulations, and tax credits on the child care choice. Some results indicate that after controlling
for parent selection factors and characteristics of care, the higher the price of care, the lower
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probability that the child care type would be selected. The paper found that price and income
were important factors in care selection, but the high quality care was not consistently chosen.
Hofferth et al. (1996) takes a similar approach in analyzing the child care choice using
multinomial analysis using data from the National Child Care Survey. The paper uses parent
reported data on their current choice of care and its characteristics as well as details on their
available alternatives not chosen. Results indicate this type of information performs better than
controlling for parent selection by using predicted prices. Also, the results were unable to
support a strong relationship between quality and choice of care. Johansen et al. (1996) find that
parents that place more importance on developmental characteristics choose to place their child
in child care centers, whereas parents who place a higher importance on convenience of care
such as hours, cost, and location, elect to place their children in child care family homes. Davis
and Connely (2005) also focus on the choice of care chosen by parents, but narrow their market
to one state, Minnesota, to capture local market effects that may be difficult to capture in a
national sample. Their analysis concentrates on price and availability in parent selection of care
using county-level data and survey data from parents. Their measure of availability for child
care centers was calculated by dividing the number of spaces in each age group by the number of
children in that age group. Availability of informal care was captured using survey data.
Separate analysis was done for employed and non-employed mothers. The results indicate that
the probability of choosing center care increases with the child’s age and family’s income,
regardless of the mother’s employment status. Family home care is more likely to be chosen by
employed mothers. This paper directly relates to my current work in that I am focusing on the
county-level data in the State of Arkansas and have data that can be linked to specific centers.
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A few papers have examined the child care labor market (Blau, 1993; Blau, 1992) which
is estimated to be elastic and the largest portion of costs associated with the production of
childcare (Helburn & Howes, 1996). Wages of child care staff are low relative to other markets
with similar education requirements due to the altruistic motivation behind individuals that select
into the child care labor market. This may be another reason the price of child care does not
fully reflect the cost of providing the services.
One major question examined is the effect of child care prices and wages on the labor
supply of women (Ribar, Special Issue on Child Care, 1992) (Ribar, A Sturctural Model of Child
Care and the Labor Supply of Married Women, 1995) especially focusing on the positive
relationship between wages and employment, the negative relationship between child care costs
and women’s labor force participation, and the transition from paid care to unpaid care due to
increases in child care costs (Blau & Robins, 1988; Blau & Robins 1989)
Past research has examined the effect of regulations on market outcomes. These papers
have looked at the effects of required regulations such has director training, staff training, staff to
child ratio, group size, curriculum, or square footage per child. The market outcomes analyzed
by this research are price of child care, number of hours, and worker wages. My paper differs
from previous work in that I am analyzing the effects of an incentivized voluntary increase in
regulations on the price of child care.
Chipty (1995) discusses the implications of increasing the quality regulations for both
child care centers and child care family homes and their impacts on prices, quantity of child care
hours consumed, and quality. Regulations included in the analysis are the number of mandated
inspections per year, the group size, training requirements of the staff, and the child to staff ratio.
11

An hedonic pricing approach with demand-side data from the 1990 National Child Care Survey
is used for each child care center and child care family home separately to test if the more
stringent regulations are binding. The results indicate that the regulations have significant
impact on each of the outcomes aforementioned. Specifically, stricter group size regulations and
an increased number of mandated annual inspections significantly increase the prices charged for
child care while regulations regarding increased training requirements and minimum staff to
child ratio significantly decrease prices. A main contribution is the analysis of the spillover
effects between child care centers and child care family homes. Results suggest that regulation
in either child care market will impact the quality of care and market outcomes in both markets.
Chipty and Witte (1997) discuss the firms’ responses to increases in minimum standard
regulations focusing on the average quality of child care available in the market, the exit of firms
not willing or able to meet the minimum standards, and the spillover effect between markets.
Results indicate that the average quality of child care improves due to local market competition
when the increases in minimum standards do not lead to firm exit. If the minimum standards
lead to firm exit, average quality of care diminishes.
Blau (2007) examines the effects of regulations such as staff-child ratio, group size, and
staff qualifications have on input use, input price, quality of care, and price of care. Blau
suggests that if buyers valued the increase in child care quality at least as much as the increase in
cost incurred by the firm to implement the increased regulation, then a price increase would be
observed. The paper uses the CQOS dataset with child care center data across four states to
exploit state variation in regulations. An interesting result analyzed in greater detail in the paper
is that the increased regulations did not appear to be binding. Results indicate that the increase in
12

price and quality due to stricter regulations is not robust to various model specifications, but does
suggest negative effects on staff wages even when regulations are not binding.
Blau (2003) analyzes the impact of state mandated child care regulations on the child care
market and labor market for mothers using county and zip code fixed effects. The results are
sensitive to model specification but indicate that changes in regulations do in fact impact the
child care market. In examining the effects of regulations on child care expenditures using data
from the Survey of Program Participation (SIPP), Blau finds that group size, hours of child
development as well as the age and education of assistant teachers significantly decrease the
amount parents spend on child care, whereas, the hours of child development required increases
expenditures. The paper hypothesizes that increased regulation will reduce the supply of
licensed child care centers and increase the price and quality of the remaining licensed child care
providers, but empirical results are convoluted and weak. My paper differs in that the quality
measure, the Better Beginnings Quality Rating and Improvement System, can be viewed as a
voluntary increase in regulations as opposed to state mandated regulations which clearly
specifies the quality impact on price charged by the child care facility.
A few papers focus on the supply-side of the child care market, specifically discussing
the production function, cost structure, and pricing strategy and their association with quality.
Blau (1997) estimates models of the determinants of quality in child care center using data from
the National Child Care Staffing Study. Quality of care is measured using the Early Childhood
Environment Rating Scare (ECERS) and the Infant-Toddler Environment Rating Scale (ITERS).
Due to the rich nature of the data, center-fixed effects are used to control for center-specific
unobservables. Results indicate that typical inputs associated with quality, such as child to staff
13

ratio, staff education, and group size have small impacts on the quality of care provided once
center fixed effects are included in the model specification. The paper reports several model
specifications focusing on ordinary least squares without center effects and those with center
effects. Teacher training was robust to various model specifications, while group size and child
to staff ratio were not (Blau, 1997). This relates nicely to my paper because the structure of the
Better Beginnings does not focus on group size or child to staff ratio but increases the amount of
training required by both directors and staff, which is more consistently related to higher child
care quality. In another paper, Blau (2000) uses the Cost, Quality, and Outcomes Study to
examine the same question and finds similar results. After controlling for center unobservable
characteristics, teacher qualifications are the only input to show a weak statistically significant
relationship with the quality produced by the child care center.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
There are child care facilities

, where

is the total number of child care

facilities in the analysis. Each child care center provides four products according to the age
categories of the child. These products are classified as

which represent infant,

toddler, preschool, and school age children. Each age group is classified as a different product
because pricing information is separated into these categories indicative of the fact that each age
category requires a different amount or type of care. The child care facility charges a different
price,

, for each age group. The facility chooses to care for,

which is the number of

children in each age category. The number of children the firm is allowed to have in each age
group is constrained by the licensed capacity. There are infant/toddler, preschool, and school
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age licenses. I assume the licensing constraints are not binding and therefore drop this detail
from the analysis. The total capacity for the firm is

∑

Each child care facility acts as a profit maximizer and selects the number of children in
each age group and the attributes of care it will provide. The facility chooses a vector of firm
specific characteristics

.

These characteristics only vary across facilities,

not by age category. Firm specific characteristics will vary by

. Variables that would be

included in the firm-specific characteristics would be hours of operation, months of operation, a
facility website, facility type such as nonprofit, church operated, and Better Beginnings rating.
The facility also chooses a vector of classroom characteristics

. These

characteristics vary across classrooms in a particular facility and across facilities. Classroom
characteristics vary by

. Variables that would be included in the classroom-specific

characteristics would be staff-to-child ratio, teacher education, and group size. Costs associated
with classroom-specific characteristics will be denoted as 𝐶 . Costs associated with firmspecific characteristics will be denoted 𝐶 . Firms can also receive subsidies,

. Subsidies to the

facilities can be in the form of donations, forgone earnings of the staff, or support from the
Special Nutrition Program. Subsidies reduce the costs incurred by the child care facilities, and
can indirectly affect the fees charged. Following Rosen’s (1974) discussion of product
differentiation in pure competition, I model the child care industry are industry as a perfectly
competitive market with differentiated products and assume the demand is given. Each firm, or
child care facility, chooses
ease of analysis. Facility

to maximize profit. At this point, I drop the subscript for
profit function is
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Π

∑[ (

)

)] − 𝐶 (

−𝐶 (

) + S(

)

By differentiating the facility’s profit function with respect to each

( )

, I am able to recover a

hedonic price function for each age category, which will be estimated.
(

)

𝐶

(

)+𝐶

(

)−

(X Q)

( )

Here the child care facility is equating its marginal revenue, or price, for a particular product to
the marginal costs associated with each attribute of care including classroom- specific
characteristics, firm-specific characteristics, and subsidies. The marginal cost associated with
each attribute can be viewed as the implicit price charged for each characteristic of care.

By differentiating the facility’s profit function with respect to
facility’s optimal level of
𝐶
(

, I am able to recover the

’s for each age category.
(

)

)

( )

The above equation gives the implicit price for each classroom-specific characteristic offered by
the firm for each age group.
By differentiating the facility’s profit function with respect to , I am able to recover the
facility’s optimal level of ’s.

∑

(

)

𝐶 (

)−

(
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)

( )

The above equation gives the implicit price for the center-specific characteristics offered by the
firm, weighted by the number of children in each age group.
The model clearly defines the hedonic pricing function to be estimated for each age category and
illustrates the decision-making process of the firm to determine the combination of attributes the
firm will choose to offer in order to maximize profits.

DATA
Data was gathered from the Licensing and Accreditation Unit of the Arkansas
Department of Human Services, Division of Child Care and Early Childhood Education
(DCCEC). Most of the information used in this paper can be gathered from the DCCECE
“Search for Licensed Child Care Providers” Web Site. The website is maintained by the
DCCEC Licensing and Accreditation Unit to promote access to high quality child care. All
facilities with prices listed on the website as of July 23, 2012 are included in the sample. The
sample includes a total of 1,996 facilities from the state of Arkansas. Of the facilities included,
there are 1,415 Licensed Child Care Centers, 533 Licensed Child Care Family Homes, and 48
Registered Child Care Family Homes. For this study I only focus on center care.
All prices are reported in daily rates for each age classification. Infants are children
between 0 and 18 months. Toddlers are children between 18-36 months. Preschoolers are
children between 30 and 71 months. School age are children 72 months or older. Rate
classifications include full day, half-time, part-time, night care, and weekend. A Full-Day is
greater than 5 hours and up to 10 hours. Half-time is between 3 and 5 hours of care, inclusively.
Part-time is less than 3 hours of care. Night care is weekday care where over ½ of the total hours
are past 6:00 p.m. Weekend is care on Saturday and/or Sunday. I will only use full-time daily
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prices for each age group reported by each child care facility. Other papers calculate an average
of rate classifications for each age or an average hourly price for each facility weighted by the
number of children enrolled in the facility. I did not use the half-time prices or part-time prices
because the relationship of these two classifications with the full-time price varied substantially
across facilities.
The quality measure used in this paper is the Better Beginnings Quality Rating System.
Better Beginnings is Arkansas’ quality rating and improvement system, similar to the Early
Childhood Quality Rating System, available starting July 1, 2010. One of the main goals was to
help families better identify high quality child care. Participation in the Better Beginnings
program is voluntary for all licensed and registered child care providers in Arkansas. Facilities
are classified with a Better Beginnings rating of Level 1, Level 2, or Level 3. Dummy variables
were created for each Level,
classified as

, another variable

and

. Because of the small number of facilities

was created which is a dummy variable if the child

care facility has either a Level 2 or Level 3 Better Beginnings rating. Providers achieving a
Better Beginnings Level were facilities that consistently provided a care environment above
minimum licensing required by the state. At the time of data collection there were 168 child care
centers with a rating of Level 1, 31 centers at Level 2, and 582 child care centers at Level 4. The
facility must meet all the requirements at one level before moving onto the next. The facilities
can be reviewed for a higher level of Better Beginnings after 6 months. The certification is valid
for 36 months and must resubmit for certification after 33 months. The five program
components that are assessed when seeking certification are Administration, Administrator/Staff
Qualifications/Professional Development, Learning Environment, Environmental Assessment,
and Child Health and Development. Each level contains greater amounts of training and
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assessment. For example, under Level 2 administrators and teaching staff must undergo 20 clock
hours of approved professional development per year which increases to 25 clock hours per year
under Level 3. The minimum licensing requirements for child care facilities requires that
administrators and staff receive 10 clock hours of training. The increase in the amount of
training above and beyond those of minimum licensing requirements increases the cost or labor
to the child care facility, however Arkansas provides grants to help with training costs. Both
Child Care Centers and Child Care Family Homes can seek Better Beginnings Certification, but
the requirements are slightly different with those for Child Care Centers being more strenuous.
A detailed description of the Better Beginnings requirements for each level can be found in the
Better Beginnings Rule Book (2010).
A benefit of the data currently used is that parents can access this same data via the
website. Other quality variables standardly used in the literature such as group size, staff-tochild ratio, and teacher education are unobservable at the time the parent initially examines the
facility characteristics. The only information regarding quality that is observable using the
DCCEC website is the facilities Better Beginnings ratings which gives parents easily
understandable information about child care quality. Firms may use their Better Beginnings
standing as a signal of quality. The signal is costly because the requirements for the Better
Beginnings ratings are above and beyond those of licensing.
Other center-specific characteristics reported on the DCCECE website are the facility’s
contact information including the website address if one is available along with the months and
hours of operation. The variable

is a dummy variable if the facility has a working website

listed. This variable is a measure of information available to the consumers and has not been
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addressed in previous literature. The variable

is a dummy variable if the facility is open

year round or a total of 12 months out of the year. The variable

is a dummy

variable if the facility is open before 8:00 am and after5:00 pm. Both variables are a measure of
increased costs due to extended operations along with convenience variables from the consumer
perspective.
Two other center-specific variables included in the analysis were collected directly from
directors at the DCCECE. The variables that are included are center affiliations. 𝐶

𝐶 is a

dummy variable is the child care facilities is sponsored or run by a religious organization.
is a dummy variable if the facility is classified as a nonprofit organization by the
DCCECE. These auspice variables are traditionally included in the literature when analyzing the
child care market.
The Special Nutrition Program (SNP) is available for all licensed and registered child
care facilities. Facilities must serve meals that meet the USDA’s nutritional standards in order to
get reimbursed for up to two main meals and one snack per day per child. The

variable is

used because it is a source of funding that offsets the costs of the child care facility in turn
decreasing the price charged.
To control for various geographic markets I obtain information regarding the average
hourly wage for child care workers from the Occupational Employment Statistics from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics for 2011. The average hourly wages are reported at metropolitan
statistical area and nonmetropolitan statistical areas in the state of Arkansas. Another variable
that is constructed is

which is the percent of facilities with a
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or

rating in

a county. This variable takes into consideration the participation rates of the child care centers in
the Better Beginnings Quality Rating and Improvement System.

Two other reported variables are if the facility is an Arkansas Better Chance facility and
if the facility accepts vouchers. Arkansas Better Chance, ABC, facilities and Head Start
facilities are not included in the estimation because these particular types of facilities must meet
the minimum licensing requirements but also additional quality regulations which are different
from those under the Better Beginnings Quality rating system. Providers of ABC facilities are
selected due to their ability to provide high-quality care for children that face a variety of high
risk factors. In contrast, Head Start programs are federally funded and are intended to promote
school readiness for children ages three to five also facing high risk factors. Vouchers are
another variable that is reported on the DCECCE website. Child Care Assistance Vouchers are
available for low-income families that meet income and employment guidelines. I do not
include these variables in my analysis because they capture a demand-side factor that will
influence the type and quality of care a parent chooses as opposed to the characteristics of care
provided by the facility which is the focus of this paper.
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Table 1
Definitions of Variables
Dependent Variable

Definition

RATE

Full time daily rate per child charged by provider,
in $

Independent Variables

Definition

BB1

1 if Better Beginnings Level 1

BB2

1 if Better Beginnings Level 2

BB3

1 if Better Beginnings Level 3
Better Beginnings Level 0 (0mitted Category)

BB23

1 if Better Beginnings Level 2 or Level 3

NONPROFIT

1 if the facility is classified as nonprofit

CHURCH

1 if sponsored or run by a religious organization

WEB

1 if the facility has a working website listed

SNP

1 if the facility receives SNP funding

YRRD

1 if the facility is open year round or a total of 12
months out of the year

EXTHOURS

1 if the facility is open before 8:00 am and after
5:00 pm

AVGHRWAGE

Average hourly wage for child care workers (OES,
BLS)

PERBB

Percent of facilities with a BB1, BB2, or BB3
rating in a county
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Table 2
Summary Statistics
Standard Deviation

Dependent Variable

Mean

RATEINFFULL

22.24363

5.769675

RATETODDFULL

21.01233

5.523271

RATEPREFULL

19.32236

5.456167

Independent Variables

Mean

BB1

0.1012433

0.3017847

BB2

0.0071048

0.0840273

BB3

0.0719361

0.2574968

NONPROFIT

0.1332149

0.3399579

CHURCH

0.2202487

0.4145984

WEB

0.1500888

0.3573172

SNP

0.5023563

0.5002302

YRRD

0.7806394

0.4139973

EXTHOURS

0.7966252

0.4026878

AVGHRWAGE

8.624147

0.2485284
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Standard Deviation

Table 3
Test of Differences in Means
Dependent Variables
RATEINFFULL

RATETODDFULL

RATEPREFULL

Mean BB

Mean No BB

23.19307

22.00711

(0.382)

(0.213)

21.9948

20.82351

(0.375)

(0.209)

19.84455

18.97078

(0.379)

(0.224)

Independent Variables

Mean BB

Mean No BB

NONPROFIT

0.2079208

0.1400602

(0.0286)

(0.0135)

0.1534653

0.1716867

(0.254)

(0.0146)

0.2326733

0.0948795

(0.0298)

(0.0113)

0.7562189

0.6065041

(0.0304)

(0.0197)

0.9108911

0.9472892

(0.201)

(0.0087)

0.8712871

0.9006024

(0.0236)

(0.116)

CHURCH

WEB

SNP

YRRD

EXTHOURS
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t-statistic
2.6952*

2.7100*

1.9164*
t-statistic
2.3328*

-0.6068

5.2245*

3.8776*

-1.8915

-1.1836

ECONOMETRIC MODEL
I estimate the reduced form hedonic price function generated above to examine the effects of
various facility characteristics on the daily full time price charged for child care. Due to data
availability, I use only firm-specific variables and the first three age categories of infant, toddler,
and preschool. I regressed the daily prices reported for each facility for each age category on the
characteristics of care. The hedonic price function measures the associated costs to the facility
for each characteristics of care involved in the production of the child care service. The
empirical specification of the hedonic price function can be written as
𝛽 +𝛽

+ 𝛽 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦 + 𝜀

(5)

is the full time daily price for each child in each age group for each firm,

where

are firm-

specific characteristics, 𝛽 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦 represent geographic controls such as the average hourly
wage for child care workers and the percent of child care facilities participating in the Better
Beginnings QRIS,, and 𝜀 is an idiosyncratic error. County controls are added to capture any
variation in prices due to differences across geographic areas. Each county has its own
individual characteristics that may influence the price they are able to charge. To control for
different markets based on geography, I used a couple of different approaches such as including
the average hourly wage rate of child care workers in an area, percent of facilities in a county
participating in the Better Beginnings program, MSA level fixed effects, and county level fixed
effects.
The hypothesized model with specific variables sign are listed below:
𝛽 +𝛽

+𝛽 𝐶
+𝛽

+𝛽

𝐶

+𝛽

+𝛽

+𝛽
+ 𝛽 𝐴𝑉𝐺
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+𝛽

+𝛽
𝐴𝐺

+𝜀

(6)

𝛽 +𝛽

+𝛽 𝐶
+𝛽
+𝛽

𝛽 +𝛽

+𝛽

𝛽 +𝛽

+𝛽

+𝛽

+ 𝛽 𝐴𝑉𝐺

+𝛽
𝐴𝐺

+𝜀

(7)
𝐶

+𝛽

+𝛽

+𝛽

+ 𝛽 𝐴𝑉𝐺
+𝛽 𝐶

+𝛽

+𝛽

+𝛽

+𝛽 𝐶
+𝛽

𝐶

+𝛽

𝐶

+𝛽
+ 𝛽 𝐴𝑉𝐺

+𝛽
𝐴𝐺

+𝛽

+𝜀
+𝛽

𝐴𝐺

+𝛽

+ 𝛽 𝐴𝑉𝐺

(8)
+𝛽
𝐴𝐺

+𝜀

(9)

Characteristics of care included in the analysis are whether or not the facility operates as
a nonprofit organization, church affiliated, has an online presence through websites or webcam
capability open year round, offers flexible hours, and quality measured by Arkansas’s Better
Beginnings Quality Rating System. The average hourly wage and percentage of facilities in a
county that participate in the Better Beginnings program are included in the analysis for control
for characteristics of the local market. I hypothesize that facilities would charge higher prices for
those characteristics associated with higher quality, specifically the Better Beginnings Rating
level, due to the cost of undergoing the Better Beginnings licensing procedure at each level. As
the levels increase, the certification requirements become more strenuous and in theory the
production of quality child care would become more costly. I also expected there to be higher
costs associated with having an online presence, open year round, and extended hours. The
Better Beginnings variable was defined as a dummy variable for each level with 0 being the
omitted category. Characteristics that were expected to have a negative relationship with the
price charged by facilities were its nonprofit status, being associated with or run by a church, and
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being a part of the special nutrition program. Nonprofit and Church are both expected to enter
with a negative sign because these types of facilities are more likely to have volunteers or
workers who work below market wage due to their own intrinsic motivation. The special
nutrition program serves as a subsidy and would reduce the cost incurred by the firm of
providing meals and snacks.

RESULTS
The results of the empirical analysis are presented below. The analysis is reported
separately for infants, toddlers, and school age children. The variables had the expected signs
which were robust to various specifications, although statistical significance weakens once MSA
and county fixed effects were added. The main variable of focus, the facilities Better
Beginnings rating, maintains its significance at higher levels of certification even as geographic
controls are included. For all age categories I can reject the joint hypothesis that the independent
variables are equal to zero. I can also reject the joint hypothesis that all quality variables,
and

are equal to zero. The results indicate that the hedonic price regression is

able to explain some of the variation in daily full time rates for child care centers.
Table 4
Infant Pricing Results

NONPROFIT

CHURCH

RATEINFFULL

RATEINFFULL

(1)

(2)

-3.175

-3.174

(0.56)***

(0.56)***

-1.687

-1.714

(0.55)**

(0.55)**
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WEB

2.909

2.760

(0.73)***
BB1

BB2

BB3

SNP

YRRD

EXTHOURS

(0.72)***

0.977

0.756

(0.47)*

(0.48)

5.931

5.707

(2.73)*

(2.72)*

2.214

2.008

(1.09)*

(1.1)

-0.461

-0.492

(0.45)

(0.45)

0.301

0.258

(0.98)

(0.96)

3.014

2.975

(0.69)***
AVGHRWAGE

(0.68)***

2.879

3.045

(0.82)***

(0.82)***

PERBB

3.522
(1.88)

CONSTANT
2

R

F-statistic
N

-5.008

-7.058

(7.04)

(7.11)

0.159

0.163

13.89***

13.19***

717

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses,
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717
5

Table 5
Infant Pricing Results Continued

NONPROFIT

CHURCH

WEB

RATEINFFULL

RATEINFFULL

(3)

(4)

-3.243

-3.243

(0.56)***

(0.56)***

-1.713

-1.741

(0.55)**

(0.55)**

2.982

2.833

(0.73)***
BB1

BB23

SNP

YRRD

EXTHOURS

(0.73)***

0.972

0.751

(0.47)*

(0.48)

2.686

2.477

(1.04)*

(1.05)*

-0.461

-0.492

(0.45)

(0.45)

0.267

0.224

(0.98)

(0.96)

3.036

2.996

(0.69)***
AVGHRWAGE

(0.68)***

2.900

3.066

(0.82)***

(0.82)***

PERBB

3.534
(1.89)

CONSTANT
R2
F-statistic
N

-5.174

-7.23

(7.04)

(7.11)

0.156

0.16

15.49***

14.55***

717

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses,
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717
5

Table 6
Toddler Pricing Results

NONPROFIT

CHURCH

WEB

RATETODDFULL

RATETODDFULL

(1)

(2)

-2.643

-2.644

(0.54)***

(0.54)***

-1.257

-1.272

(0.48)***

(0.48)***

2.986
(0.66)***

BB1

BB2

BB3

SNP

YRRD

EXTHOURS

(0.66)***

0.644

0.543

(0.42)

(0.43)

4.897

4.800

(2.57)

(2.57)

2.297

2.198

(1.02)*

(1.04)*

-0.385

-0.404

(0.4)

(0.4)

-0.239

-0.262

(0.86)

(0.86)

2.491

2.469

(0.68)***
AVGHRWAGE

2.910

2.860
(0.79)***

PERBB

(0.68)***
2.934
(0.80)***
1.68
(1.71)

CONSTANT
2

R

-5.154

-6.075

(6.81)

(7.02)

0.137

0.138
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F-statistic
N

12.27***

11.25***

758

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses,

758
5

Table 7
Toddler Pricing Results Continued

NONPROFIT

CHURCH

WEB

RATETODDFULL

RATETODDFULL

(3)

(4)

-2.689

-2.689

(0.54)***

(0.54)***

-1.280

-1.295

(0.48)**

(0.48)**

3.030

2.955

(0.66)***
BB1

BB23

SNP

YRRD

EXTHOURS

0.642

0.541

(0.42)

(0.43)

2.657

2.558

(0.96)**

(0.98)**

-0.393

-0.412

(0.4)

(0.4)

-0.257

-0.28

(0.87)

(0.86)

2.518

2.487

(0.68)***
AVGHRWAGE

(0.66)***

2.877
(0.79)***

PERBB

(0.68)***
2.950
(0.8)***
1.677
(1.71)

CONSTANT

-5.295
31

-6.215

R2
F-statistic
N

(6.81)

(7.02)

0.135

0.137

13.67***

12.41***

758

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses,

758
5

Table 8
Preschool Pricing Results

NONPROFIT

CHURCH

WEB

RATEPREFULL

RATEPREFULL

(1)

(2)

-1.679

-1.668

(0.51)**

(0.51)**

-1.398

-1.405

(0.41)***

(0.41)***

2.204
(0.55)***

BB1

BB2

BB3

SNP

YRRD

EXTHOURS

AVGHRWAGE

2.091
(0.55)***

0.158

0.013

(0.37)

(0.38)

2.303

2.161

(2.39)

(2.42)

2.200

2.046

(0.09)*

(0.92)*

-1.057

-1.087

(0.36)**

(0.36)**

1.111

1.120

(0.49)*

(0.49)*

1.108

1.077

(0.54)*

(0.54)*

3.556

3.666
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(0.71)***

(0.72)***

PERBB

2.592
(1.58)

CONSTANT

-12.165

-13.610

(6.11)*

(6.3)*

R2

0.112

0.115

F-statistic

9.77***

9.15***

N

912

912

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses,

5

Table 9
Preschool Pricing Results Continued

NONPROFIT

CHURCH

WEB

RATEPREFULL

RATEPREFULL

(3)

(4)

-1.680

-1.669

(0.51)**

(0.51)**

-1.399

-1.405

(0.41)***

(0.41)***

2.206
(0.55)***

BB1

BB23

SNP

YRRD

EXTHOURS

2.093
(0.55)***

0.157

0.013

(0.37)

(0.38)

2.212

2.060

(0.84)**

(0.87)**

-1.058

-1.087

(0.35)**

(0.36)**

1.111

1.120

(0.49)*

(0.49)*

1.108

1.078
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AVGHRWAGE

(0.54)*

(0.54)*

3.557

3.667

(0.71)***

(0.72)***

PERBB

2.592
(1.58)

CONSTANT
R2
F-statistic
N

-12.169

-13.614

(6.1)*

(6.29)*

0.112

0.115

10.86***

10.07***

912

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses,

912
5

Results indicate that facilities with the Better Beginnings Rating charged higher prices
once they reached the second and third levels in the Better Beginnings program. For infants
there is a premium for being classified in the Better Beginnings program even at level one.
Those facilities that care for infants and have a Better Beginnings rating of one star charge $0.98
more per day or $4.89 more per week as compared to those without a Better Beginnings rating.
Results suggest that facilities at the Better Beginnings level two rating are able to charge
$5.93 more per day or $29.66 more per week when compared to those facilities not in the Better
Beginnings program of infant full time care. These results may be overestimated due to the
small number of facilities with a Level 2 Better Beginnings quality rating. A better
representation of the data can be found by looking at the combined variable

. For all age

groups, there was a premium once the facility reached the Better Beginnings Level 3. Facilities
that are rated level three in the Better Beginnings program are able to charge between $2.20 and
$2.30 more per day or between $11.00 and $11.49 more per week than those facilities that are
not in the program. When analyzing the analysis using the variable
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, facilities with Better

Beginnings ratings of Level 2 or Level 3 are able to charge between $2.12 and $2.69 more per
day or between $10.60 and $13.45 more per week than those facilities that are not in the
program. The quality results fit the hypothesis that quality care is costly.
Other variables of interest were the classification of the center as nonprofit or being
associated with a church. The nonprofit variable is negative and statistically significant for all
age groups. Facilities that are classified as nonprofit charge between $1.70 and $3.18 less per
day which is between $8.40 and $15.88 less or per week on average as compared to those
facilities classified as for profit, holding all else constant. Being associated with or run by a
church is also negative and statistically significant for all age groups. The results indicate that
facilities affiliated or operated by a church charge between $1.26 and $1.69 per day less or
between $6.29 and $8.44 per week less than other facilities, holding all else constant.
Another variable of interest that has not been examined in the current child care literature
is whether or not the child care facility has an online presence through a working website or
blog. About twelve percent of the centers included in the analysis had a working website
available with information regarding the teachers, curriculum, programs offered, menus, and
webcam capabilities that can be logged in by parents to view their child’s daily activities. The
variable indicating whether or not the child care center had a working website was positive and
statistically significant for all age groups. Facilities with a web presence charge between $2.20
to $2.99 more per day or $11.02 and $14.93 more per week as compared to those that do not
have a working website.
The variable that could be classified as a subsidy was negative and statistically significant
for only preschoolers as hypothesized. Facilities on the special nutrition program charge about
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$1.06 less per day or $5.29 less per week as compared to those facilities not registered for the
program. Licensing requirements for child care facilities require that a breakfast be provided to
children that arrive at the facility before 7:00 a.m. Also, a mid-morning snack and mid-afternoon
snack and evening meal shall be provided. Facilities that are registered with the Special
Nutrition Program receive a partial reimbursement for the meals provided, in essence decreasing
the cost of food for the facility.
Another variable examined was the number of months the child care center was open.
Those facilities that care for preschoolers and are open for twelve months are able to charge
about $1.11 more per day or $5.56 per week than those that are not open for twelve months who
are primarily closed for the summer months. The sign of the dummy variable

was not

consistent across age groups or different model specifications.
The variable indicating whether or not the child care center offered extended hours was
positive and statistically significant for all age groups. Those facilities open before 8:00 a.m. and
after 5:00 p.m. charge between $1.11 and $3.01 more per day or between $5.54 and $15.07 more
per week than those not offering extended hours. For infants, there was an increase in about $3
per day or $15 per week. For toddlers the price was about $2.50 more per day while
preschoolers was about $1 more per day. These results hold if the variable is defined with
stricter hours, such as before 7:00 a.m. and after 6:00 p.m.
Two variables that were included in the analysis to control for various geographic
markets within Arkansas were the average hourly wage of child care workers and the percent of
facilities in a county that were participating in the Better Beginnings program. The participation
variable was not significant for any age group, while the wage variable was statistically and
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economically significant for all age groups. The main cost faced by child care facilities is the
cost of labor due to the labor-intensive nature of child care. Helburn and Howes estimate that
labor costs account for about 70% of child care centers’ costs per child per month (Helburn &
Howes, 1996). The results indicate that the average hourly wage of child care workers is
positive and statistically significant across all age groups, suggesting that as the average hourly
wages of child care workers in the area where the facility is located increase by one dollar the
daily rates for care increase by between about $2.86 to $3.56 per day or between $14.30 and
$17.78 more per week.
The results are similar to previous findings analyzing child care prices. The main
difference is the inclusion of information variables and the Better Beginnings levels which
represent both quality and quality measures.

CONCLUSION
The results of this paper indicate that licensed child care centers with the Better
Beginnings rating charge significantly higher prices once the highest levels of certification are
obtained, relative to those not participating in the quality certification program. While past
research has found only a weak relationship between quality and price in the child care market,
this paper finds statistically and economically significant effects of quality variables on the price
charged by child care providers. The main contribution of this paper is the verification of the
value of information available to parents through the use of the Quality Rating and Improvement
System. More work needs to be done to gather data to better control for the characteristics of the
child care facility, but results suggest that making information on child care quality readily
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available to parents through a quality rating system allows child care facilities to make their
quality known to the parents in a way that is accessible and easily understandable.
These results provide support for policy in favor of greater reporting or release of
information regarding child care characteristics, especially those associated with higher quality
care.

Quality Rating and Improvement systems aggregate quality information in a way that is

readily available to consumers in a concise report that allows for direct comparison of child care
services. Previous quality measures used in the literature such as staff-to-child ratio, group size,
and teacher training are less likely to be used by parents when making decisions regarding child
care due to the difficulty of gathering the appropriate data measures and lack of ability to
interpret their importance. Policy making child care characteristics easily observable could help
in reducing the information asymmetry between parents and child care providers by making
more information available to parents increasing the incentive for child care providers to deliver
high quality child care in order to remain competitive in an ever growing market. This is an
important policy finding that extends beyond Arkansas in terms of helping consumers. Child
care quality can be viewed as a public goods problem in that its impact spills over to all of
society. The results suggest that consumers of child care are willing to pay for quality when they
can identify and evaluate it.
Future work includes extending the analysis to address the demand for quality measured
by the facility’s Better Beginnings classification along with other traditional quality measures
used in the literature. Current efforts are being undertaken to collect greater detail of facility
characteristics through surveys administered to child care facilities across the state of Arkansas
to control for other variables of interest such as children characteristics, teacher characteristics,
and other quality variables such as group size and child to staff ratio. Including these variables
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will allow for a greater comparison to other research in the area of child care and analyze the
relationship between quality as measured by teacher training, child to staff ratio, and group size
and the facilities Better Beginnings classification. The plan is to administer surveys to parents to
control for family characteristics and to better comprehend parents’ understanding of the Better
Beginning Quality Rating System. To do this I will create a comprehensive dataset that can
match parents and children to specific child care facilities. I also hope to compare Arkansas’s
Quality Rating and Improvement System to other states based on criteria such as components of
the regulations, participation rates, information available to consumers, and prices. Research
concerning the Quality Rating and Improvement Systems adopted by over half the states needs to
be conducted to understand the effects of the various programs on market outcomes such as the
price and accessibility of quality care.
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APPENDIX
Description of Sample
This paper focuses on child care centers with care for children under the age of six. This
excludes those children classified as school age. I also exclude centers that are open for less than
eight months out of the year. The reason for making this restriction is the presence of summer
camps or other short term care circumstances. There are only seven centers that are dropped
from the analysis for this reason, one in the infant age classification, one in the toddler
classification, and five from the preschool classification. ABC and Head Start programs are also
excluded from the analysis which addressed in the main body of the paper.
Table A1
Pricing Results with Metropolitan Statistical Area Fixed Effects
RATEINFULL
NONPROFIT

CHURCH

WEB

BB1

BB2

BB3

SNP

YRRD

RATETODDFULL

RATEPREFULL

-1.660

-1.443

-0.757

(3.07)**

(2.76)**

(1.45)

-1.187

-0.701

-0.960

(2.50)*

(1.54)

(2.25)*

0.798

1.073

0.477

(1.50)

(2.07)*

(0.93)

0.501

0.248

-0.099

(1.01)

(0.51)

(0.19)

3.699

3.136

0.979

(2.03)*

(1.87)

(0.53)

1.482

1.713

1.528

(2.00)*

(2.41)*

(2.15)*

-0.074

-0.135

-0.823

(0.20)

(0.39)

(2.33)*

0.867

0.226

2.105
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EXTHOURS

CONSTANT
R2
N

(1.08)

(0.31)

(4.15)**

3.414

2.721

0.502

(5.47)**

(4.46)**

(0.95)

18.257

17.448

16.241

(13.31)**

(14.58)**

(14.41)**

0.40

0.34

0.25

717

758

912
5

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses,
Table A2
Pricing Results with County Fixed Effects
RATEINFULL
NONPROFIT

CHURCH

WEB

BB1

BB2

BB3

SNP

YRRD

EXTHOURS

RATETODDFULL

RATEPREFULL

-1.715

-1.351

-0.764

(3.27)**

(2.73)**

(1.21)

-1.395

-0.685

-0.445

(2.80)**

(1.57)

(0.93)

0.755

1.040

1.112

(1.21)

(1.74)

(1.74)

0.668

0.344

-0.260

(1.74)

(0.97)

(0.52)

4.068

3.274

0.971

(2.26)*

(1.54)

(0.44)

1.868

2.215

2.830

(1.95)

(2.28)*

(2.83)**

-0.116

-0.180

-0.515

(0.30)

(0.51)

(1.26)

0.040

-0.309

-0.941

(0.04)

(0.35)

(0.86)

3.898

3.337

4.203

(5.56)**

(4.92)**

(4.33)**
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CONSTANT
R2
N

14.359

14.278

(10.17)**

(11.31)**

0.48

0.42

717

12.453
(8.89)**
0.31

758

760
5

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses,
Table A3
Pricing Results with County Fixed Effects and BB23

NONPROFIT

CHURCH

WEB

BB1

BB23

SNP

YRRD

EXTHOURS

CONSTANT

RATEINFFULL

RATETODDFULL

RATEPREFULL

-1.762

-1.373

-0.726

(3.38)**

(2.78)**

(1.15)

-1.41

-0.695

-0.429

(2.85)**

(1.6)

(0.9)

0.778

1.049

1.095

(1.24)

(1.77)

(1.71)

0.66

0.34

-0.255

(1.73)

(0.97)

(0.51)

2.188

2.382

2.536

(2.50)*

(2.69)**

(2.77)**

-0.115

-0.184

-0.509

(0.3)

(0.52)

(1.25)

0.009

-0.323

-0.914

(0.01)

(0.37)

(0.83)

3.931

3.357

4.166

(5.59)**

(4.93)**

(4.30)**

14.37

14.282

12.447

(10.20)**

(11.33)**

R2

0.48

0.42

0.31

N

717

758

760

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses,
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(8.86)**

5

CHAPTER II

An Indivisible Resource Perspective: The Case of Child Custody
Jennifer L. Hafer

Amy Farmer

ABSTRACT
Why do some divorcing couples use the courts to settle child custody disputes?
Settlement literature predicts that cases should settle efficiently and avoid court costs under
symmetric information. Shavell (1993) proposes that settlement failure occurs when the resource
under dispute is indivisible and the value placed on it is so high that wealth constraints are
binding. These characteristics are present in child custody disputes. In these cases, sharing
children through joint custody may be impractical because parents are not able or willing to
share. The paper uses the Stanford Child Custody data set to empirically analyze how
indivisibility may lead to settlement failure in child custody disputes using variables such as
distance between the divorced parents’ households, levels of hostility, and differences in custody
type filed. Other variables included in the analysis are income, home ownership, involvement
levels of each parent with the children, number of children, each parent’s desire to settle the
divorce case outside of the courts, and the use of lawyers. Our results show that parents who file
for different types of physical custody and couples that display high levels of hostility are more
likely to end up in court.
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INTRODUCTION
In the presence of symmetric information, standard theory predicts that all cases will
settle efficiently to avoid court costs. Resources can be divided in some manner that leaves both
parties better off than they would be from costly litigation. However, as Shavell (1993) points
out, when the resource in dispute is indivisible, it may simply be impossible to make such an
allocation. Of course, transfer payments should solve the problem as long as the parties are not
constrained in their ability to make a Pareto improving payment. The likelihood such constraints
exist increases in the value of the object in dispute and in the inability of financial markets to
provide a solution. When the dispute revolves around a child, both factors are present. Parents
are likely to value their children beyond which they have the capacity to pay, and given that
children do not represent a financial asset and are not collateral, capital markets cannot provide
solutions. Thus, disputes over child custody provide a fertile application of Shavell's (1993)
model. In this paper, we will provide an in depth literature review (Section II) and apply the
model to the case of legal disputes over child custody (Section III). Using the Stanford Child
Custody data set (discussed in Section IV), we will present empirical results (Section V) that
support the notion that the use of the courts and conflict are more likely when the resource in
dispute is indivisible. Finally we will conclude and discuss avenues of further research (Section
VI).

LITERATURE REVIEW
Divorcing couples “bargain in the shadow of the law” based on the legal rules in place
concerning child custody, child support, spousal support, visitation, and the division of the
marital assets (Mnookin & Kornhauser, 1979). Parents may attempt to negotiate outside of the
courtroom in light of the legal framework imposed. Each component of divorce agreements still
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possesses a large range of uncertainty which makes private ordering more difficult. Private
ordering occurs when parents negotiate the outcomes of the divorce themselves, without the help
of the courts. In their paper they discuss the trade-offs parents may choose to make, such as
accepting less monetary support in order to obtain their preferred custody outcomes.
Negotiations arranged outside of the court lead to beneficial outcomes because they better reflect
the preferences of the parents and lead to higher incidences of compliance as well as reducing
transactions costs and uncertainty about trial outcomes. They suggest variables such as spite,
distaste or breakdown of negotiations, uncertainty and risk preferences, and indivisibility lead
individuals to use the courts to settle divorce disputes. In another paper, Mnookin (1993)
suggests that negotiations fail due to strategic barriers, the principal/agent problem, evaluations
of risk, and the information collection and social interaction during the bargaining process. He
suggests that these barriers may be mitigated through the use of mediators or other neutral third
parties.
Brining (2006) discusses the concept of default custody laws. These laws act as
“endowment points” for divorcing couples knowing what the outcome will be if they go to court.
To avoid the default, couples have an incentive to negotiate to achieve their favored outcome.
One fear is that parents, especially mothers, would use other bargaining tools such as child
support, spousal support, or visitation to obtain their preferred custody allocation. Using data
from Oregon, Brining tests the effects of the new joint custody laws on divorce outcomes. She
finds that occurrences of joint custody significantly increase and, as expected the amount of child
support paid to mothers decreases. Other outcomes include higher court usage to settle divorce
disputes and parenting disagreements along with greater incidences of failed mediation. Brining
proposes that although some states have strongly encouraged joint physical custody, there is still
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uncertainty about the outcomes of custody and divorce disputes leading to more litigation
because no true default rule has been established.
In response to Shavell’s discussion on indivisible resources, Kuperman (2011) discusses
the indivisibility of a child using the biblical story of King Solomon (1 Kings 3:19-28). The
story addresses the claims of two women to one baby. The King said that they would “cut the
baby in half,” or partition the child, all the while to gauge the responses of the women so he
could illicit the true evaluation of the child. Kuperman goes on to discuss the theory of allotment
in which the property that is indivisible goes to the co-owner that values the object most, paying
the other co-owner their value for the surrendered property, similar to the discussion presented
by Shavell. This discussion follows closely with the theoretical economics models of the
allocation of child custody upon divorce (Rasul, 2006; Francesconi & Muthoo, 2003). When one
parent’s valuation of the child is significantly greater than the other’s, sole custody of the child is
given to the parent that values the child most. When the parents’ valuations are similar, joint
custody is the preferred outcome with the majority share again going to the spouse with the
highest valuation. Both outcomes, if decided on before divorce, optimize the investments by
both parents into child quality and maximize the welfare of the child.
In the large scale study conducted by Maccoby and Mnookin (1992), which will be used
in this paper, legal conflict increased as the involvement levels of parents with the children and
the hostility levels increase or there was concern over the well-being of the child in one of the
parent’s households. They also show that joint custody is less likely as the number of children in
the household increases and as hostility between parents increases. Although joint custody is
intended to increase involvement and continued contact of the nonresidential fathers, Albiston et
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al. (1990) show that it is the hostility of the parents that influences the involvement of the father
more than the allocation of joint legal custody.
Peeples et al. (2008) analyze the characteristics that lead to settlement versus going to
court. Using data from North Carolina, in an environment with mandatory mediation, results
suggest that couples who have different perceptions of the main caregiver, accusations of
domestic violence or unfit parenting are more likely to use the courts to settle divorce disputes.
Farmer and Tienfenthaler (2001) also analyze the variables that contribute to the use of courts in
divorce cases. They propose models of asymmetric information and optimism to better fit the
aspects of divorce disputes. Using this approach they focus on the use of variables that deal with
information revelation and uncertainty about expectation of trial outcomes. Using data from the
Stanford Child Custody dataset they find that variables such as time between separation and
filing, the woman’s income, and home ownership significantly decrease the likelihood of going
to court, while variables such as lawyer representation and the man’s income increase the
likelihood of litigation. We will follow much of the framework of this paper, but will primarily
focus on aspects concerning the child, specifically characteristics related to indivisibility.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
In this section we apply the theoretical results found in Shavell (1993) to the issue of
child custody disputes. In the presentation of our model, we use similar notation as much as
possible in order to make the relationship between our models clear. It is not our intention to
develop any new theory surrounding disputes over an indivisible object, but to relate Shavell's
model to this issue and generate predictions that can be empirically tested.
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An immediate general result from his paper is that when an object is indivisible, this
generates the possibility that settlement will fail. His model provides further insight into when
this can be overcome, but before reaching further into the model, an immediate empirical
prediction is evident.
Prediction 1: Conflict increases as the likelihood of joint physical custody decreases.
Specifically, if parents live close to one another and/or have an amicable relationship they
should be better able to share their children after divorce and, therefore, conflict or use of the
courts is less likely (settlement is more likely).
Suppose from this point forward, we are referring only to situations in which divisibility
is not an option, one in which the good in question must be given to only one party in its entirety.
How will the negotiations develop and when will the parties reach agreements without the use of
litigation? Following Shavell's model, we begin by defining the following terms:
= Father
= Mother
= Wealth of the

or

= Value of child to or
𝐶 = Trial cost to

or

= Probability the Mother wins at trial
= Willingness of

or

to pay to get physical custody

= Willingness of

or

to accept to relinquish custody

Π = Payoff to

or

in trial

As Shavell notes, as long as the willingness to pay of one party exceeds willingness to
accept of another,

there exists a Pareto optimal settlement and trial is avoided;
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otherwise, there will be a trial. Effectively, one parent "purchases" custody from the other. If
this arrangement does take place, then we should observe lower financial payments accruing to
parents who negotiate to receive custody as compared to those who do not.
Prediction 2: Parents who negotiate custody outside the courts should, all else equal, receive
less in the divorce settlement (both in terms of the martial assets and spousal support) than those
who do not. In terms of child support, cases that are settled out of court are more likely to have
included the negotiation on custody outlined above and, therefore, those who settle are likely to
agree to lower awards (in exchange for custody) compared to those who go to court.
Note also that willingness to pay includes the ability to pay. Of course, then, we expect
settlement when willingness to pay is high and willingness to accept is low. To determine these
values and make predictions concerning settlement, we must first consider what each player
expects to be the outcome in trial, which provides each player with their outside option.
Trial
Consider first the mother's payoff in trial, denoted Π

.

Her expected wealth after trial is her

pretrial wealth less court costs plus the expected value of winning custody. Equation (1)
represents her expected trial payout.
(1)

Π

−𝐶 +

Similarly, the father's expected payout in trial in described in equation (2).
(2)

Π

−𝐶 +( − )

Willingness to Pay
The mother is willing to pay

to receive custody if after doing so her payout exceeds

her expected trial outcome. In other words, she is willing to pay
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iff`

−

(3)

+

−𝐶 +

Rearranging (3) and taking into account that she must be both willing and able to pay, we
can represent her willingness to pay in (4a).
( − )

(4a)

+𝐶
𝑜𝑡

Repeating a similar exercise for the father, we find that
+𝐶

(4b)

𝑜𝑡
Noting that

is her willingness to pay when (4a) is binding.

Willingness to Accept
Knowing what each is willing to pay is not instructive without knowing what each is
willing to accept; only by comparing the two is it possible to determine if there is a range in
which the couple can reach an agreement. Party will accept any amount

that generates a

better expected outcome than trial. The minimum the mother and father would be willing to
accept to avoid litigation are found in equations (5a) and (5b) respectively.
(5a)
(5b)

−𝐶
( − )

−𝐶

Note that in both cases, players are willing to pay more than they are willing to accept
when the probability that the mother wins is 50%. However, as her chance of winning rises, she
is willing to pay less while her minimum willingness to accept rises. This should be obvious as
her expected outcome of litigation grows more favorable. The probability that the mother wins
depends on the rules of the courts which have evolved. Previously, there existed a preference for
father custody under rules of property. There was then a transition to a preference for mother
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custody especially under the tender years assumption. Currently, courts operate under the
regime of the best interests of the child. Another system not fully adopted is joint custody.
Under the first two rules, there was almost no uncertainty who would receive custody of the
child especially if the case went to court. Now, under the best interests of the child, uncertainty
is introduced which may push individuals, especially mothers, to negotiate before, “in the
shadow of the law,” in order to avoid the possibility of losing custody of the child.
Shavell's proposition leads us to the prediction that settlement is more likely as
and as

rises

falls. Some predictions fall right out of these equations leading to the following.

Prediction 3: Settlement is more likely when
a) the wealth of the players rises
b) court costs rise
The impact on settlement is ambiguous as
c) the probability that the mother will win in court rises
d) the more each player values the child rises
The ambiguities result from uncertainty regarding who values the child more, and as a result,
who might be able to "purchase" custody from the other. For example, if it is the mother who is
seeking custody, as her value of the child rises, she is willing to pay more. But, if he is seeking
to compensate her, then as her value increases the minimum she is willing to accept rises thereby
impeding settlement. Predictions concerning (c) and (d) must be made in the context of specific
cases of negotiations.
Case 1: The mother is seeking custody
If

, the transaction will take place successfully. If she is not wealth constrained,

this will occur when
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−

(6)
If

−

(

)
(

)

(she values kids at least as much as he does), this condition always holds. Equation

(6) generates the following predictions.
Prediction 4: Settlement is more likely when:
a) the mother's value of the child rises
b) the father's value of the child falls
c) the probability that she will win in court rises
One caveat is that if she is wealth constrained, then further changes in these variables
become irrelevant since this transaction cannot successfully take place. So, while for a given
mother a rise in her value of the child may not increase settlement, across the population of
mothers seeking custody, conditional on wealth a greater value of the child should promote
settlement.
Case 2: The father is seeking custody from the mother
If

, this transaction will take place successfully. If he is not wealth constrained,

this will occur when
(7)
If

−

−

(

)

.

(he values kids at least as much as she does), this condition always holds. Equation

(7) generates the following predictions.
Prediction 5: Settlement is more likely when:
a) the father's value of the child rises
b) the mother's value of the child falls
c) the probability that she will win in court falls
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Note that these predictions are exactly opposite to those in prediction 4.
Discussion
Note that both parents may be simultaneously wishing to obtain custody and that
conditions (6) and (7) can hold simultaneously, particularly if court costs are high and both
parents value the children similarly. In this case, as long as both parents have sufficient income,
whichever parent values the child the most will get custody because more surplus is created, and
an efficient transfer can be made. This result is proven by Shavell (1993). Importantly, in this
case settlement will occur and the outcome is efficient.
However, when one (or both) parent is wealth constrained, the solution could be
inefficient, even if it is self-negotiated. In other words, the parent who values the child the most
may not be the parent who obtains custody. While it will be impossible to test these predictions
empirically since we can never know which parent values the child more, we will lay out the
theoretical model as it applies to this circumstance. This is an important exercise in that it sheds
light on the conditions that might give rise to this inefficiency which will also have an impact on
the welfare of the children involved. Given that Farmer and Tiefenthaler (2003) find that even
when parents make trades that are efficient between them, children may be harmed, the fact that
suboptimal trades among parents can occur heightens the potential that self-negotiated
agreements are not necessarily in the best interest of children. An inefficient outcome would
occur when the parent with the higher valuation is wealth constrained and the couple agrees to
give custody to the other parent or the parent with the lower valuation. The discussion of
inefficient outcomes is beyond the scope of this paper.
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DATA AND EMPRICAL SPECIFICATION
The theoretical predictions of the model are tested using the Stanford Child Custody
Study which is a three wave, longitudinal study of 1124 families who filed for divorce in two
California counties (San Mateo and Santa Clara Counties) between September, 1984 and April,
1985. Eligibility for the study required that the couple had children who would remain minors
throughout the course of the study. Three telephone interviews were conducted with the parents
over a three-year period and additional information was added from court records. While the
study has four principal areas of inquiry, the one most relevant to this study is the focus on the
legal process leading to settlement. The data include information on how the couple worked out
their differences regarding custody, child support, visitation, and the division of the family home
as well as the terms of all awards which were reached by the end of the study. The data set also
includes demographic information including income and employment data. While the data set
includes 1124 observations, because of attrition and missing income and other data, there are
only about 600 cases which include all the information needed to estimate the court equation.
See Maccoby and Mnookin (1992) for a detailed discussion of the Stanford Child Custody
Study.
A major goal of this research is to estimate the determinants of couples using the courts to
resolve custody disputes; specifically, we are interested in whether the likelihood of using the
courts increases with the indivisibility of the child(ren). Our hypothesis, following Shavell
(1993) is that the indivisibility of children (along with wealth constraints) explains why child
custody cases go to court rather than being settled. Empirically, the level of conflict is measured
as either (0) the father and mother worked out a custody agreement on their own or in
negotiations through their lawyers or a mediator or (1) the case went to court. It is not clear in
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the data whether the case was heard by the judge but settled by the couple or whether the judge
actually rendered a decision. Thus, settlement resulting from court are treated the same as cases
where the judge actually determines the award. A dummy variable for the use of lawyers is also
included in the analysis of the use of courts. Mothers are more likely to be represented by
lawyers than fathers. The difference is statistically significant (𝑡

8 7 )in part due to the fact

that the plaintiffs are more likely to be represented by counsel and mother filed in 68% of the
cases. In the majority of cases, the couple worked out the terms of the settlement on their own.
However, approximately 33% of the cases were heard by a mediator or a judge. It should be
noted that in about 10% of the cases, the divorce was not yet final at the end of the study. For
these cases, the dependent variable is whether or not they had used the courts by the end of the
study. However, it is possible that some of the unsettled cases that did not go to court by the end
of the study did eventually end up in court. As a result, the level of dispute may be
underestimated.
While all children are certainly indivisible, joint custody of children is common and, in
California, strongly encouraged by the court system. However, sharing is less possible, and,
therefore, court is more likely, when parents live far from each other and when parents do not get
along with each other. Therefore, we measure indivisibility with two variables. First, we
include “how long it takes to travel between the mother’s and father’s homes.” This variable is
measured in minutes. Second, we measure the parent’s willingness to share as the “respondent’s
hostility toward the spouse.” This variable was constructed by the interviewer and is scaled from
1 to 10 where 1 indicates that the respondent “speaks well of the spouse” and 10 indicates that
the respondent is “extremely bitter, hostile, and critical.” Another variable included in the
analysis that indicates a lack of cooperation on the part of the parents is a dummy variable if the
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parents filed for different physical custody assignments. Parents must decide on both legal
custody and physical custody. Legal custody refers to the decision making involving issues such
as the child’s education, religion, and health care. In our sample almost 80% of the parents
chose joint legal custody which is being used more to encourage continued involvement of the
noncustodial parent in the child’s life (Huang et al., 2003). Physical custody refers to the day-today care of the child and indicates the primary residence of the child. The possible outcomes for
physical child custody include mother sole physical custody, father sole physical custody, joint
physical custody, and split custody. Sole physical custody is a situation where the child is living
primarily with one parent which visitation from the non-custodial parent. Joint physical custody
refers to a situation where the child is spending considerable time in both parents’ households. It
should be expected that the more the parents disagree on the physical custody of the child(ren) in
question the higher the likelihood the couple will use the courts to settle their divorce and
custody disputes.
The predictions of the model presented in Section 2 indicate that the likelihood of conflict
or court decreases as the wealth of the two players increase. The rationale is that as wealth
increases, the players are less likely to be wealth constrained and, therefore, settlement is more
likely. In addition, the model predicts that conflict is less likely as court costs increase. This
result is intuitive as the players are more likely to avoid court if its costs are high. The wealth of
the father and the mother are measured as (1) monthly earnings converted by the original
investigators to an annual equivalent for each player and (2) a dummy variable indicating
whether or not the couple owns a home. If there are significant marital assets to be divided (only
home ownership is included in this data set), each player is less wealth constrained as they can
bargain with this financial asset. Finding a good proxy for court costs is more difficult with our
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data set. Because the Stanford Child Custody Study includes data only on divorcing couples in
California (and only in two counties), different states' divorce laws and court costs cannot be
used as proxies for the costs of continuing the dispute. However, the data set includes
information on the desire of the parents to make divorce decisions outside of court. This variable
was reported by the parents and is scaled from 1 to 10 where 1 indicates that the respondent
“wants courts involved” and 10 indicates that the respondent “wants decisions between husband
and wife.” The variable suggests that the parents are anticipating high costs to continue the
dispute whether financial or emotional.
The model also predicts that the value that each parent’s places on the children also
impacts the likelihood of conflict. However, the prediction is ambiguous and depends on which
parent has a higher value. If the mother wants the children more than the father and is seeking
custody, the likelihood of court decreases with her value as she is willing to pay more as her
value increases. In this case, the likelihood of conflict increases with the father’s value as it will
be more difficult to compensate him as his value increases. These predictions are reversed if the
father has a higher value of the children and is seeking custody from the mother. However, in
our data set, this latter outcome is unlikely. The mother and father were asked about their hopes
for the custody arrangement at the first interview. Only one mother in the sample indicated that
she did not seek, at a minimum, joint custody of the children. As a result, we expect that the
former case is most likely and, therefore, we expect the usage of the court to decrease with the
mother’s value of the children and increase with the father’s value of the children. We proxy the
mother and father’s value of the children with their own perceptions of their “involvement with
the child(ren) before the separation.” These variables are measured on a scale from 1 to 10 with
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1 indicating “low involvement” and 10 indicating “high involvement.” We also include the
number of children as a regressor as value is likely to increase with the number of children.
The final prediction is that an increase in the likelihood that the mother will win custody
in court decreases the likelihood that the case goes to court when the mother is seeking custody.
The likelihood that the mother wins in court is predicted to have the opposite effect if the father
is seeking custody. The likelihood that an individual mother will win in court is, obviously,
unobservable. However, the couple might base their expectations about the likelihood of
winning on the outcomes of other custody cases. For example, if mothers usually win custody in
a given court system, the likelihood that an individual mother wins increases. Therefore, in a
national data set, the percentage of custody cases won by mothers in court in the past might be a
good proxy for . Unfortunately, the Stanford Child Custody Study is drawn from only two
counties in California and, as a result, there isn’t enough variation to include this measure as a
proxy for . Consequently, we do not test this prediction of the model empirically.
Table 1 presents the sample means and standard deviations for all variables included in
the estimation of the court equation.
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Table 1
Summary Statistics
Mean

Standard
Deviation

Court

0.339

0.479

Hostility

5.449

1.943

Distance

79.862

159.497

Father Earnings
Mother Earnings

$32.418.89
$10,961.67

$25,865.68
$11,433.18

Home

0.576

0.495

Diff Phys File

0.191

0.394

Father Involve

7.790

2.226

Mother Involve

8.673

1.872

Children

1.675

0.734

Father out court

8.203

2.673

Mother out court

7.332

3.203

Father Lawyer

0.518

0.500

Mother Lawyer

0.721

0.449

The table shows that approximately 34% of the couples end using the courts to settle their
custody disputes. In addition, couples live, on average, 80 minutes of travel time from each
other after they divorce and exhibit significant hostility with an average of approximately 5.4 on
a 10-point scale. Not surprisingly, fathers make significantly more than mothers with an average
annual income of $32,418.89 compared with $10,961.67 for mothers. 58% of the couples in the
sample owned a home. About 19% of the couples included in our analysis filed for different
custody outcomes. Both fathers and mothers report to have been highly involved with the
children before the separation with averages of 7.8 and 8.7 on a 10-point scale, respectively.
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Parents also desire to settle the divorce outside of the courts with an 8.2 and 7.3 for fathers and
mothers respectively on a 10-point scale. Use of lawyers was around 52% for fathers and 72%
for mothers.

RESULTS
The results from estimating the court equation using the probit method are presented
below in Table 2. The coefficients are followed by the robust standard errors in parenthesis. The
partial derivatives or marginal effects, evaluated at the sample means, are also presented below.
To follow Shavell’s theory, we run the analysis for only those situations in which divisibility was
not an option. In other words, the model is restricted to those cases which result in either mother
sole physical custody or father sole physical custody. Two models are reported. The second
model omits the dummy variables for whether the father or the mother used a lawyer in the
divorce case because these variables may suffer from endogeneity due to their interactive nature.
In our analysis we predict correctly 77.88% of the cases for model 1 and 75.29% of the cases for
model 2. We can reject the joint hypothesis that the independent variables are equal to zero. The
estimation of the court equation indicates the probit analysis is able to explain some of the
variation in the use of courts among divorcing couples. Other model specifications are included
in the Appendix for further comparison including using the logit method to estimate the court
equation and the inclusion of all physical custody types, specifically joint physical custody. The
variables maintain the expected signs although statistical significance weakens once somewhat
once estimated using these various specifications.
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Table 2
Probit Results from Estimation of the Court Equation
Court (1)
Coefficient

Partial
Derivative

Hostility

Distance

Father Earnings

Mother Earnings

Home

Diff Phys File

0.121
(0.039)**

(0.013)**

-0.001

-0.000

(0.001)

(0.000)

-2.80e-07

-9.71e-08

(2.97e-06)

(1.03e-06)

5.30e-06

1.84e-06

(5.90e-06)

(2.04e-06)

0.369

0.369

-0.455

-0.159

(0.164)**

(0.058)**

0.482
(0.189)**

Father Involve

Mother Involve

Children

Father out court

Mother out court

Father Lawyer

0.042

0.177
(0.073)**

0.062

0.021

(0.034)

(0.012)

0.048

0.017

(0.037)

(0.013)

0.032

0.011

(0.096)

(0.033)

-0.017

-0.006

(0.025)

(0.009)

-0.045

-0.016

(0.023)*

(0.008)*

0.629

0.214
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(0.166)***
Mother Lawyer

0.633

0.200

(0.186)***
Constant

(0.054)***

(0.052)***

-2.257
(0.638)***

R2

0.223

0.223

𝐶

88.23***

88.23***

N

434

434
Obs.

0.339

Pred. P 0.298
5,

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses,

Table 3
Probit Results from Estimation of the Court Equation –
Continued
Court (2)
Coefficient

Partial
Derivative

Hostility

Distance

Father Earnings

Mother Earnings

Home

0.125

0.044

(0.037)***

(0.13)***

-0.001

-0.000

(0.001)

(0.000)

2.24e-06

7.94e-07

(2.77e-06)

(9.78e-07)

2.22e-06

7.84e-07

(5.87e-06)

(2.08e-06)

-0.249

-0.089
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Diff Phys File

(0.156)

(0.056)

0.824

0.311

(0.175)***
Father Involve

Mother Involve

Children

Father out court

Mother out court

Constant

(0.066)***

0.057

0.020

(0.032)

(0.011)

0.378

0.013

(0.036)

(0.013)

-0.009

-0.003

(0.096)

(0.034)

-0.045

-0.016

(0.025)

(0.009)

-0.072

-0.026

(0.021)***

(0.008)***

-1.072
(0.555)

R2

0.170

0.170

𝐶

73.17***

73.17***

N

437

437
Obs. P 0.336
Pred. P 0.312

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses,

5,

Indivisibility is proxied by both the travel time between the mother and father’s homes
post-separation and the hostility between the couple. The results indicate that hostility
performed as predicted, while the average distance between homes was marginally significant
and negative, opposite of the predicted sign. The theory predicted that conflict would increase as
the likelihood of joint physical custody decreases; however, our results suggest the opposite may
be true in that the closer the parents live to one another, the more likely it is that joint custody is
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a viable option, and conflict between spouses or the use of courts increases. This result may be
due to the fact that parents’ decisions about where to live after the divorce sends a signal of the
type custody they hope to have. In the sample those families with joint physical custody have
the shortest distance between the two parents’ households with father sole custody next followed
by mother sole custody. This follows results presented in Maccoby and Mnookin (1992) that as
the distance between parents’ households increases, it become more difficult to sustain joint
physical custody. Upon further analysis, as the travel times between the mother’s and father’s
household increase the more likely it is that one parent has sole custody. More empirical work
needs to be done with regards to the distance variable. Greater hostility between the parents is
also an indicator that sharing custody will be difficult. The results show that as the hostility
index increases, so does the likelihood of using the courts to settle the dispute. Another variable
included in the analysis to represent a lack of communication and cooperation throughout the
divorce process is whether or not the parents filed for the same type of physical custody. Results
indicate that parents who file for different types of physical custody are more likely to use the
courts.
The model predicts that wealth constraints will increase use of the courts because without
sufficient funds parents will not be able to sufficiently compensate each other for custody;
therefore, conflict should fall as wealth increases. Neither the mother’s nor the father’s income
has a significant impact on the likelihood of going to court. However, the couples’ wealth,
proxied by home ownership, does have the expected negative impact on court usage. This result
is interesting and suggests that a parent who wants custody may trade off other marital assets to
which they are entitled in order to negotiate for custody. Further work that examines whether
child support payments are also negotiated in this manner would be interesting.
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The model also predicts that if the mother is seeking custody, her value of the children
will decrease the likelihood of using the courts while use of the courts increases with the father’s
value of the children. The results indicate that the father’s involvement with the children before
the separation does have a positive and marginally significant impact on the likelihood of going
to court. The higher the father’s involvement the more likely it is that the couple will use the
courts to settle the divorce. However, the mother’s involvement with the children before divorce
does not significantly impact the likelihood of a couple using the courts. It may be due to the
belief that fathers must exert more legal effort when fighting for custody of their children
because they must overcome the social and legal informal preference for mother physical
custody (Fox & Kelly, 1995; Maccoby & Mnookin, 1992).
Another prediction of the model is that court costs are a deterrent to using the courts to
settle custody disputes. The proxy variables that we use for court costs were the mother’s and
father’s desire to settle the case outside of court. The mother’s desire to settle the divorce case
outside of court was negative and significant, while the father’s desire did not significantly
impact the likelihood of settlement in model 1 and only marginally in model 2. One concern
could be that the mother may be giving up or compromising on divorce outcomes such as
custody, child support, spousal support, or the division of marital assets in order to avoid court.
This question cannot be answered in this analysis but should be addressed in future research.
To obtain better proxy variables for court costs, further work that uses a national data set would
allow for a better test of this prediction of the model. Such a data set could also be used to test
the hypothesis that the probability that the mother wins the custody dispute in court is an
important determinant of conflict.
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CONCLUSION
When there is symmetric information, standard theory predicts that all cases will settle
efficiently and avoid court costs. Resources can be divided in some manner that leaves both
parties better than their outcome would be from litigation. However, as Shavell (1993) points
out, when the resource in dispute is indivisible, it may simply be impossible to make such an
allocation. Of course, transfer payments should solve the problem as long as the parties are not
constrained in their ability to make a Pareto improving payment. The likelihood such constraints
exist increases in the value of the object in dispute and in the inability of financial markets to
provide a solution. When the dispute involves a child, both factors are present. Parents are
likely to value their children beyond their ability to pay, and given that children cannot be used
as collateral, capital markets cannot provide solutions. Thus, disputes over child custody provide
a fertile application of Shavell's (1993) model.
In this paper, we apply the model to the case of legal disputes over child custody. This
exercise highlights several testable hypotheses. First, the assumption that indivisibility increases
the use of the courts can be tested by examining whether or not those couples for whom the
indivisibility of the children seems to be more of an issue are more likely to go to court. Second,
the model predicts that as the father’s and mother’s wealth increases, the likelihood of using the
courts falls because wealth constraints are less likely to be binding. Court costs are also
predicted to dissuade couples from going to court. The model indicates that settlement is more
likely when the party seeking custody places a higher value on the children and when the other
party places a lower value on the children. In addition, an increase in the likelihood that the
mother will win custody in court decreases the likelihood that the case goes to court when the
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mother is seeking custody. The likelihood that the mother wins in court is predicted to have the
opposite effect if the father is seeking custody.
We test some of these predictions using the Stanford Child Custody data set. The probit
estimation of the determinants of using the courts to settle child custody disputes provide some
support for the notion that the use of the courts is more likely when the resource in dispute is
indivisible. We proxy indivisibility with both (1) the distance between the mother and father’s
homes and (2) the hostility between the couple. The results show that higher levels of hostility
increase the likelihood of going to court. In addition, the results support the prediction that
wealth constraints, such as owning a home, over which the couple can bargain lowers the
likelihood of court.
This paper provides some initial support for Shavell’s proposition that the indivisibility of
the resource under dispute may explain why some cases go to court instead of settle, as predicted
by most of the theoretical literature. Further work on the child custody case would both provide
another test of Shavell’s proposition and provide additional evidence to encourage settlement in
child custody disputes. Empirical work using a national data set would allow for a more rigorous
test of the predictions outlined here for the child custody case.
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APPENDIX

Table A1
Logit Results from Estimation of the Court Equation

Hostility

Distance

Father Earnings

Mother Earnings

Home

Diff Phys File

Court (1)

Court (2)

Coefficient

Coefficient

0.218
(0.067)***

(0.063)***

-0.002

-0.002

(0.001)

(0.001)

-1.81e-07

4.31e-06

(4.85e-06)

(4.62e-06)

9.95e-06

4.12e-06

(9.73e-06)

(9.93e-06)

-0.817

-0.473

(0.290)*

(0.271)

0.793

1.381

(0.316)**
Father Involve

Mother Involve

Children

Father out court

Mother out court

Father Lawyer

0.216

(0.293)***

0.110

0.101

(0.057)

(0.054)

0.083

0.063

(0.064)

(0.590)

0.072

0.001

(0.164)

(0.169)

-0.034

-0.077

(0.042)

(0.043)

-0.076

-0.121

(0.038)*

(0.036)**

1.105
72

(0.286)***
Mother Lawyer

1.095
(0.345)***

Constant

-3.978

-1.851

(1.099)***

(0.909)**

R2

0.227

0.172

𝐶

76.51***

65.99***

N
Correctly

434

437

77.65%

74.83%

Classified
5,

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses,

Table A2
Probit Results from Estimation of the Court Equation
including all Custody Classifications
Court (1)
Coefficient

Partial
Derivative

Hostility

Distance

Father Earnings

Mother Earnings

Home

0.108

0.038

(0.032)***

(0.011)***

-0.001

-0.000

(0.000)

(0.000)

2.69e-06

9.56e-06

(2.24e-06)

(7.95e-06)

2.41e-06

8.55e-06

(4.15e-06)

(1.47e-06)

-0.494

-0.179

(0.144)***

(0.052)***
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Diff Phys File

0.555
(0.150)***

Father Involve

Mother Involve

Children

Father out court

Mother out court

Father Lawyer

0.016

(0.029)

(0.010)

0.035

0.012

(0.033)

(0.012)

0.114

0.040

(0.084)

(0.030)

-0.034

-0.012

(0.022)

(0.008)

-0.054

-0.019

(0.019)**

(0.007)**

0.445

0.550
(0.162)***

Constant

(0.058)***

0.045

(0.145)**
Mother Lawyer

0.207

0.154
(0.048)**
0.181
(0.048)***

-1.777
(0.535)***

R2

0.210

0.210

𝐶

114.31***

114.31***

N

586

586
Obs. P 0.351
Pred. P 0.315

Correctly

76.45%

Classified
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses,
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Table A3
Probit Results from Estimation of the Court Equation
including all Custody Classifications - Continued
Court (1)
Coefficient

Partial
Derivative

Hostility

Distance

Father Earnings

Mother Earnings

Home

Diff Phys File

0.108
(0.032)***

(0.011)***

-0.001

-0.000

(0.000)

(0.000)

2.69e-06

9.56e-06

(2.24e-06)

(7.95e-06)

2.41e-06

8.55e-06

(4.15e-06)

(1.47e-06)

-0.494

-0.179

(0.144)***

(0.052)***

0.555
(0.150)***

Father Involve

Mother Involve

Children

Father out court

Mother out court

Father Lawyer

0.038

0.207
(0.058)***

0.045

0.016

(0.029)

(0.010)

0.035

0.012

(0.033)

(0.012)

0.114

0.040

(0.084)

(0.030)

-0.034

-0.012

(0.022)

(0.008)

-0.054

-0.019

(0.019)**

(0.007)**

0.445
75

0.154

(0.145)**
Mother Lawyer

0.550
(0.162)***

Constant

(0.048)**
0.181
(0.048)***

-1.777
(0.535)***

R2

0.210

0.210

𝐶

114.31***

114.31***

N

586

586
Obs. P 0.351
Pred. P 0.315

Correctly

76.45%

Classified
5,

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses,

Table A4
Logit Results from Estimation of the Court Equation
including all Custody Classifications

Hostility

Distance

Father Earnings

Mother Earnings

Home

Court (1)

Court (2)

Coefficient

Coefficient

0.192

0.199

(0.055)***

(0.053)***

-0.001

-0.002

(0.001)

(0.001)

4.72e-06

8.19e-06

(3.63e-06)

(3.83e-06)*

4.33e-06

1.79e-06

(6.78e-06)

(6.84e-06)

-0.875

-0.585

76

(0.251)***
Diff Phys File

0.913
(0.251)***

Father Involve

Mother Involve

Children

Father out court

Mother out court

Father Lawyer

(0.239)*
1.336
(0.236)***

0.078

0.082

(0.048)

(0.048)

0.064

0.051

(0.056)

(0.053)

0.216

0.151

(0.142)

(0.145)

-0.062

-0.094

(0.036)

(0.038)*

-0.091

-0.129

(0.032)**

(0.030)***

0.794
(0.249)***

Mother Lawyer

0.960
(0.296)***

Constant
2

-3.150

-1.590

(0.917)***

(0.809)*

R

0.213

0.179

𝐶

100.05***

89.66***

N

586

Correctly

76.28%

591
75.30%

Classified
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses,
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CHAPTER III:

Do Mothers Trade Child Support to get the Custody They Desire?

ABSTRACT
This paper examines the hypothesis that divorcing couples make trade-offs between child
custody and child support in order to secure their preferred custody outcome. Mnookin and
Kornhauser (1979) introduce the concept of “bargaining in the shadow of the law” which
describes negotiations made between parents in the framework of their existing legal setting.
Using data from the Stanford Child Custody Study, I will test to see if parents, specifically
mothers, accept lower amounts of child support in order to receive sole physical custody of their
children. I use a two-stage estimation approach to account for the joint determination of child
custody and child support. I find that the legal environment surrounding divorce proceedings,
including aspects such as mandatory mediation along with a preference of the courts for joint
custody, significantly increases the likelihood of joint physical custody. Results from the
estimation of the child support equation suggest that along with the typical guideline variables
such as income of the parents, number of children, and visitation, the time between separation
and filing for divorce and the mother filing for divorce significantly decrease the support award
while lawyer representation of the mother significantly increases the amount of child support
issued. Using a selection model, I find that the significant negative relationship between the
custody and support equations, accounted for in the selection term, signifies that mothers who
“win” their preferred custody are accepting lower amounts of child support.
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INTRODUCTION
This paper examines the concept of trade-offs between custody and child support in order to
secure their preferred custody outcome. Mnookin and Kornhauser (1979) introduce the concept
of “bargaining in the shadow of the law” which describes negotiations made between parents in
the framework of their legal setting. Using data from the Stanford Child Custody dataset, I will
test to see if parents, specifically mothers, accept lower amounts of child support in order to
“win” their preferred custody outcome, or receive mother sole physical custody of their children.
I use a two-step approach to control for selection and the joint determination of custody and
support. Equations for child custody and child support are estimated including variables
describing the legal framework the couples are bargaining under, traditional child support
guideline variables, and variables to represent opportunities for negotiations.

This technique

focuses on the bargaining process that takes place when divorcing parents are negotiating over
the terms of divorce outcomes and more realistically represents the process parents undergo
when making decisions concerning the child. Although the role of bargaining is evident in the
theoretical literature about divorce outcomes, few papers have found significant evidence of
trade-offs between support and child custody. This paper adds to the literature by providing
empirical evidence of negotiations and bargaining between parents over divorce outcomes
concerning the children.
To begin I will discuss the timeline of the divorce proceedings and gain insight into the
bargaining process between divorcing parents. Once separation takes place, parents begin the
process toward divorce settlements, either on their own, through lawyers or mediators, or
litigation. Parents decide on their ideal divorce outcomes, including those such as the allocation
of legal and physical custody as well as financial terms such as the division of marital assets and
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the amount of child support or alimony. If the parents preferred outcomes are equal, parents are
able to settle on their own without dispute. In most instances, preferences will differ which
allows parents to make trade-offs based on the legal framework they are under. At this time the
negotiation process or “bargaining in the shadow of the law” begins even if the couple has not
formally filed for divorce. I find that the legal environment surrounding divorce proceedings,
including aspects such as mandatory mediation along with a preference of the courts for joint
custody, significantly increases the likelihood of joint physical custody. Results from the
estimation of the child support equation suggest that along with the typical guideline variables
such as income of the parents, number of children, and visitation, the time between separation
and filing for divorce and the mother filing for divorce significantly decrease the support award
while lawyer representation of the mother significantly increases the amount of child support
issued. Using a selection model, I find that the significant negative relationship between the
custody and support equations, accounted for in the selection term, signifies that mothers who
“win” their preferred custody are accepting lower amounts of child support.
In this paper, I will provide an in depth literature review (Section II). Using the Stanford
Child Custody data set (discussed in Section III), I will present empirical results (Section IV) that
support the notion that the mothers make tradeoffs between custody and support. Finally I will
conclude and discuss avenues of further research (Section V).

LITERATURE REVIEW
In order to present the vast literature on divorce with a particular focus on outcomes
pertaining to the child, I will organize the literature review in a way that follows the progression
of the idea examined in my paper. I will first introduce papers that have shaped the literature on
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divorce outcomes by developing theory describing the divorce proceedings. I will then introduce
papers that discuss the allocation of child custody, both legal and physical. This section of the
literature shapes my first stage analysis in determining child custody, specifically focusing on the
parents preferred custody outcome. Next, I will present literature discussing the determination of
the financial aspects of divorce, particularly the assignment of child support. I will use this
section of the literature to develop my second stage analysis of the amount of child support
awarded. Finally, I will present literature that focuses on the joint determination of child custody
and child support. Because I am testing to see if parents, specifically mothers, accept lower
amounts of child support in order to “win” their preferred custody outcome, it is imperative that I
understand each aspect of the divorce literature to develop a sound strategy that is grounded in
previous literature.
Many topics concerning the outcomes of divorce have been analyzed with a particular
focus on the relationship between child custody and child support. Theory suggests couples
bargain outside of the courtroom “in the shadow of the law” (Mnookin and Kornhauser, 1979).
In other words parents negotiate in light of the legal framework in place regarding physical
custody, legal custody, and child support. Each parent is endowed with a set of “bargaining
chips” in terms of the preferences and guidelines of the courts, whether formal or informal.
Under private ordering, parents can negotiate the terms of their divorce and foster an agreement
that makes them both better off than if a judge were to decide their divorce outcomes. Mnookin
and Kornhauser suggest parents themselves have more information about their situation than the
courts and its judges which enables them to make better decisions concerning the best interest of
their children. Although there is structure given by the legal environment the parents face, it can
be vague and in turn increases the uncertainty of the outcome if the divorce case proceeds to
82

trial. The main topics discussed in this paper are physical custody and child support. These
issues are intricately intertwined, and the line between them is often blurred. The main reason
these two outcomes are linked is due to the possibility of tradeoffs, accepting less child support
to achieve the parents’ preferred custody outcome depending on the preferences of the parents
for their children and themselves.
As mentioned above, the legal framework in which divorce cases are handled greatly
influences the outcomes. Emery (1994) discusses the process and purpose of mediation for
divorcing couples. He states the goal of custody mediation is to reduce the incidences of
litigation by providing parents an informal arena to negotiate custody issues and develop
parenting plans to better serve their children. By examining the divorce process from the
perspective of both the mother and father, Emery theorizes that parents behave strategically and
are uncompromising over certain issues depending on who does or does not want the divorce. In
essence, the parent who does not want out of the marriage will argue over the aspect of the
divorce outcomes they believe the other values most in order to complicate and delay
proceedings. Women who do not want the marriage to end are more likely to dispute financial
terms of the divorce under the belief that the man’s greater investment and ownership in the
financial wellbeing of the family will make him uncompromising over monetary issues. Men
who do not want out of the marriage, on the other hand, will argue over custody issues knowing
the woman will not sacrifice on custody issues due to her investment as the children’s primary
caretaker.

Under the framework of a traditional marriage, we would expect to see more

instances of mothers wanting out of the marriage when examining issues of custody disputes.
Given this perspective, I expect lower child support when the mother wants out of the divorce
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because she must bargain more intensely to overcome the father’s distaste for settlement due to
his emotional ties to the marriage.
Reynolds et al. (2007) employ an investigative approach to assess child custody
outcomes in North Carolina in 2002 in a legal setting that requires mandatory mediation before
proceeding to litigation. The main focus is on the influence of mandatory mediation on joint
custody. Critics have proposed that mediators use joint custody as a default, even in cases where
joint custody is not appropriate such as hostile environments. By gathering data on divorce cases
that settle using various processes, specifically mandatory mediation, settlements negotiated by
lawyers, and those cases that proceed to litigation, Reynolds et al. find that the concerns of
mandatory mediation pushing joint custody are unwarranted. Of the cases in the their study, less
than 16% of the cases result in joint physical custody with significantly more occurrences in
settlements negotiated by lawyers than in mediation. In mediation, mothers received the highest
incidence of sole physical custody. Other results suggest that plaintiffs were more likely to be
the mothers and win their desired custody outcome. Reynolds et al. suggest that it is not a
maternal preference that leads to these findings, but that plaintiffs are self-selected due to their
desire to achieve their preferred custody outcome. While incidences of joint physical custody in
mandatory mediation did not increase, over 90% of the cases that settled after mandatory
mediation resulted in joint legal custody.
There is an abundance of empirical work discussing the allocation of child custody,
whereas, the theoretical literature is sparse. Rasul (2006) and Francesconi and Muthoo (2003)
develop bargaining models that determine the optimal allocation of child custody upon divorce
depending on the parent’s valuation of the child based on parental investment into the children.
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If one parent values the child significantly more than the other, the optimal custody allocation is
sole physical custody to the parent with the highest valuation. When the parents’ investment in
the child is relatively homogenous, joint custody is the appropriate outcome. This theory gives
the foundation for including measures of parental involvement as a proxy for the parents’
investment in their children. If one parent is more involved, we would expect to see sole
physical custody. If the parents report similar levels of involvement, joint custody is the optimal
outcome.
When discussing child custody it is imperative to distinguish between physical custody and
legal custody. Legal custody is more of a symbol of the parents’ involvement in the children’s
life primarily in making decisions regarding education, health, and religion, whereas, physical
custody concerns the day-to-day care of the child and coincides with the children’s residence.
Seltzer (1990) uses a multivariate analysis to predict the custody outcome, both physical and
legal, of divorces in Wisconsin using data from 1980 and 1985. She distinguishes between
physical and legal custody because different factors impact the determination of these very
different types of custody outcomes. Seltzer estimates a multinomial logit model with the
various combinations of physical and joint custody as dependent variables. Results suggest that
income variables have a significant effect on legal custody whereas family composition variables
such as age and gender of the children determine physical custody. Joint custody is more likely
among families with higher education levels, greater involvement of the father, and those with
legal representation.
Fox and Kelly (1995) model the likelihood that the father will receive sole physical custody
of the children with a focus on gender stratification. Using data from Wisconsin shortly after the
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introduction of joint legal and joint physical custody, they estimate a logistic regression
predicting the likelihood the father would receive sole physical custody of the children using
only those cases where sole physical custody was issued, not taking into consideration legal
custody. In terms of gender influences, the father is more likely to receive sole physical custody
when the children are older and male. Other variables that increase the father’s odds of receiving
sole physical custody include being the plaintiff and when an investigation is done to assess the
caretaking ability of the mother. Mothers are more likely to receive sole physical custody when
they have at least a college education, the father is unemployed or defaults on child support
payments, and as fathers have higher incomes. Variables such as the number of children, the
mother’s employment status, and whether or not the mother and father were represented by
lawyers did not significantly impact the physical custody outcome. Fox and Kelly focus on the
importance of the inclusion of variables that describe the legal setting in which child custody is
determined. Based on the results, it appears fathers must exert greater effort during the legal
process to overcome, whether formal or informal, preferences for maternal custody.
Joint legal custody is intended to encourage the involvement of the father through increased
responsibility for decision-making concerning his children, establish a co-parenting relationship
between parents, and to increase child support compliance rates; however, critics warn that
mothers may try to trade off financial terms in order to achieve sole legal custody of their
children under a legal preference for joint legal custody. Albiston et al. (1990) use the Stanford
Child Custody Dataset to determine if these effects are present in cases that result in joint legal
custody. In their dataset 79% of the families have joint legal custody, while only 20 percent
have joint physical custody. When comparing families that have sole mother legal custody to
those with joint legal custody, there was no significant difference in father involvement
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measured by overnight visitation or, after taking into consideration the father’s income and child
support compliance rates. Mothers with sole legal custody did not receive less child support in
order to receive their preferred custody outcome once the father’s ability to pay was controlled
for. These results suggest that claims that joint legal custody will alter the parent’s behavior are
not substantiated.
Another main focus of the literature concerning divorce outcomes is the determination of the
magnitude of child support awards. In 1988 the Family Support Act mandated child support
guidelines based on the income of the parents, the number of children, and the time the children
spend in each household. Maccoby and Mnookin (1992) estimate a regression equation with
these guideline variables and find they only explain 36 percent of the variation in child support
awards. Due to the lack of explanatory power, they suggest that there must be other factors
significantly predicting child support awards. Results suggest that by including education and
employment information the percent of variation increases to 54 percent. To test for the
possibilities of tradeoffs between custody and support, Maccoby and Mnookin also examined the
effects of conflict on child support awards for those mothers who achieved their preferred
custody outcome. The conflict variable used in this analysis is a measure of the hostility
between parents. Using ordinary least squares regression and holding child support guidelines
constant, they find no significant effect of conflict on awards suggesting that the level of conflict
in divorce cases involving children have no effect on the amount of child support awarded. In
other words, tradeoffs between custody and child support do not take place when mothers
receive sole physical custody of the children. They attribute the lack of significance to the
guidelines established decreasing the amount of ambiguity in child support awards. My paper
seeks to answer a similar question but uses a more sophisticated econometric technique by
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including the joint determination of child custody and provides a more comprehensive picture by
controlling for other relevant variables impacting the amount of child support awarded.
Using data from the Stanford Child Custody Study, Farmer and Tienfenthaler (2001)
estimate the award levels in light of conflict. They select variables based on their discussion of
information asymmetries, bargaining power, and uncertainty about the outcome of litigation.
Using tobit estimation they find that going to court over child support issues significantly
increases the amount of child support awarded which they attribute to strategic behavior.
Variables that significantly increase the amount of child support awarded are the payer’s income,
the number of children, if the payee has been divorced before, and if the payee has a college
degree. The payee’s income, joint custody which proxies for the amount of involvement of the
parents, if the payer has an attorney while the payee does not, and if the payer has been divorced
before all significantly decrease the amount of child support awarded. Farmer and Tienfenthaler
also briefly discuss the possibility of endogeneity between the amount of conflict and the amount
of support ordered. To correct this issue they mention checking the two stage least squares
estimates using the predicted values from the conflict equation estimated in the paper, but do not
find significance. Their result indicating that conflict significantly increases the amount of child
support differs from previous studies using data from the Stanford Child Custody Study.
The literature also focuses on the economic well-being of the custodial parent, typically the
mother, and the child after divorce with a particular focus on compliance rates. Weiss and Willis
(1985) discuss children as collective consumption goods where the mother and father get utility
from the well-being of the children. To explain why fathers, typically the noncustodial parents,
do not maintain the same standard of living for their children after divorce, they attribute it to the
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fact that the fathers can no longer monitor the spending of the mother, typically the custodial
parent, on the children. To explain the custody allocation to the mother, Weiss and Willis say
that it is because mothers are anticipated to be more altruistic toward the children. As a result
some fathers may in fact increase the monetary flow to the mother in order to encourage the
mother to maintain the well-being of the children.
Weiss and Willis (1993) use data from the National Longitudinal Study of the High School
Class of 1972 to examine the effects of parents’ income on transfers upon divorce, including
property, alimony, and child support. They use initial earnings and property ownership to
calculate the trajectory of both earnings and assets to understand how initial levels and postdivorce levels impact the awarded and paid amount of child support and alimony. Estimates are
calculated for the present value of the amounts of support actually paid taking into consideration
the risk of noncompliance. After estimating an equation for transfer amounts controlling for
selection of divorce, Weiss and Willis find that the initial and growth of the husband’s earnings
significantly increase the amount of support paid, while the mother’s initial income is associated
with significantly larger transfers and current income significantly lower transfers. The result for
the mother’s income is related to compensation for investments made in the marriage and the
opportunity cost associated with caring for the children. They find fathers supplement child
support with increased levels of property or alimony by calculating the difference between
intended support due to the presence of a child and the actual amount of paid child support.
Their estimates suggest intended support is about 13% greater than the actual child support and
wives with children receive about 40% more total support than those without. Even with these
differences, results indicate that post-divorce standards of living for the custodial parent and
child is about half that of the pre-divorce levels. Again this inconsistency is due to monitoring.
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When discussing compliance rates of child custody payments, Peters et al. (1993) distinguish
between formal compliance, following child support guidelines enforced by the state, and
informal compliance, following a self-negotiated agreement established by the spouses. Using
data from the Stanford Child Custody Study, they find that formal compliance rates are around
71% while informal compliance rates are about 76%. Informal modifications to the divorce
settlement are not reported to the courts so the parents must believe the agreements are selfenforcing. The informal compliance rates will be higher when the father is more altruistic
towards his children, he is able to pay, when there is less uncertainty about how the money is
being spent, and a co-parenting relationship has been established. Peters et al. estimate the
likelihood that modifications are made to the child support award. Results suggest that when
fathers that are unemployed, the child changed residential custody, and the time since divorce
has been longer all significantly increase the probability of modifications. Families with higher
levels of conflict and less father involvement are significantly less likely to report modifications
to the child support awards. They also estimate the compliance rates for both formal and
informal modifications. More highly educated fathers and fathers with high levels of
involvement with the children have significantly higher rates of compliance, both formal and
informal. Again fathers that are unemployed, families with high levels of contention concerning
divorce settlements, and fathers with less contact with their children have significantly lower
rates of compliance. This article is one of the first to address informal modifications agreed
upon by parents. Again parents are bargaining in the shadow of the law given the child support
guidelines allowing for higher levels of utility and higher levels of compliance rates.
The next section of the literature focuses on the joint determination of child custody and
child support. Farmer and Tienfenthaler (2003) introduce a bargaining model for negotiations
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during divorce cases using legal guidelines as the “endowment points” to describe changes in
custody and visitation. Using data from the Stanford Child Custody Study, they find parents
make adjustments to the initial agreement of child support and visitation, mostly a reduction in
both components, which does not fit the predictions of their model and often times does not
result in Pareto improvements and may lead to decreased well-being of the children. They
explain these results may be due to enforcement costs and altruistic behavior on behalf of the
parents toward their children. Farmer and Tienfenthaler propose a child support assurances
system that would eliminate transactions costs and better monitor the link between child support
and visitation to ensure the children do not suffer any negative consequences from negotiations
concerning visitation and child support.
Brinig (2006) discusses the concept of joint custody as a “penalty default rule.” Because
there is a presumption or default rule of joint custody if the divorce case reaches the courts,
parents must bargain before litigation if it is their desire to obtain a sole custody arrangement.
Brinig suggests that one of the only ways for parents to credibly reveal their preferred custody
outcome of sole custody given this legal setting is to sacrifice monetary support for custody. She
tests for the concept of a default rule for joint custody using Oregon data after a change in
legislation towards a preference for joint custody. First the probability that a couple would
choose joint custody was estimated. Results suggest that after the statute was in place, there was
a significant increase of about 30% in the instances of joint custody. Other significant indicators
were the length of marriage, number of children, and the number of previous marriages for the
father. These predicted probabilities were then used to estimate the amount of child support that
would be awarded. Brinig finds that parents are in fact accepting less child support after the
change in legislation. Mothers who were represented by counsel, counties with higher incomes,
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and households with more children received higher amounts of child support. The variable with
the predicted values for joint custody was negative and significant. Other outcomes of the
change in the statute include an increased number of modifications to parenting agreements,
higher incidences of litigation, and more failed mediation attempts. These results offer
conflicting views of the penalty default rule. Brining attributes this indeterminacy to the vague
nature of the of the courts’ preference for joint custody which increases the uncertainty of trial
outcomes making negotiations more difficult.
In order to account for the interrelatedness of custody allocation and support
determination, several estimation techniques have been utilized such as two stage least squares,
simultaneous equation estimation, and latent-class analysis. Huang et al. (2003) uses data from
Current Population Survey-Child Support Supplement to examine the effects of child support
enforcement variables such as state legislation, compliance rates, and expenditures on child
support collection on divorce outcomes. They focus on the likelihood of joint legal custody and
parental involvement measured by visitation levels and the number of days the noncustodial
parent spends with the child. Using a two stage least squares approach to control for unobserved
characteristics that may affect both custody and involvement, they first estimate the likelihood
that joint legal custody will be awarded. The predicted values from the custody equation are
then used in the child support award equations. Results indicate that state enforcement variables
significantly increase the likelihood of joint legal custody along with higher education and
income for parents, a long previous marriage, and the number of children. Employment status,
age of parents, and minority status all significantly decrease the probability of joint legal
custody. Variables that significantly increase child support payments include education and
income of the custodial parent, the number of children, age of parents, and duration of marriage.
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Male custodial parents, minority status and employment status of the custodial parent lead to
significantly lower child support payments. This paper is one of the first to investigate the role
of child support enforcement variables. Huang et al. find that these variables significantly
increase the likelihood of joint legal custody which in turn increases the amount of child support
payments.
Seltzer (1991) also examines the impact of legal custody on the amount of child support
fathers are order to pay using data from Wisconsin. Previous studies have found that joint legal
custody increases the amount of support paid by fathers, but when estimating the custody and
support equations simultaneously allowing for correlated errors to capture the interrelatedness of
these decisions, Seltzer finds that higher child support payments for those families with joint
legal custody is primarily due to the higher incomes of the fathers in joint cases relative to those
in which the mother has sole custody. The father’s income is the only variable to significantly
increase the probability of joint legal custody. When estimating the child support equation,
variables such as father’s income, number of children, marital duration, and when both parents
have lawyers all significantly increase the amount of child support owed, while the mother’s
income significantly decreased the amount of child support owed. Seltzer’s results suggest that
we cannot attribute higher child custody payments to joint legal custody, but to the fact that those
families that choose joint legal custody have higher incomes making them more able to meet the
financial outcomes of divorce. Neither Huang et al. (2003) nor Seltzer (2003) examine the
bargaining aspect of divorce settlements, especially mothers accepting lower child support
awards to avoid joint legal custody, but instead focus on actual child support compliance rates.
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Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of the Class of 1972, Teachman and
Polonko (1990) test if parents make trade-offs between various dimensions during the divorce
process. In order to gain insight into the negotiation process of divorcing couples, they select an
estimation technique that takes into consideration the interdependence of divorce outcomes and
the possibility of tradeoffs. Teachman and Polonko first use a latent-class approach to determine
the patterns of divorce outcomes including child custody, child support, visitation, and the
division of marital assets. Outcomes suggest there are two classes that best fit the data. The
“standard divorce package” consists of mother physical custody, visitation for the father, and a
child support award. The second class represents a situation in which visitation, child support,
and mother custody are less likely to occur. Observations are then assigned to their appropriate
classes. Next, they use a logistic regression to estimate the likelihood of being in one of the two
classes selected using the latent-class approach. Father’s income, the presence of a young child
and marital duration increase the likelihood of being in the “standard divorce package,” while
not having a lawyer significantly decreases the likelihood.
My paper contributes to the current state of the literature on divorce by empirically
examining the idea of bargaining between physical custody and child support which has only
been presented theoretically in previous research. I look at custody outcomes from the
perspective of the parents’ preferred custody outcome, specifically focusing on mothers
achieving their preferred outcome of mother sole physical custody. By introducing variables
such as “Difference Custody Wants” and “Time Between Separation and Filing” which indicates
the presence of negotiations, this paper tests for tradeoffs between custody and support.
Although others have used data from the Stanford Child Custody Study, these variables have not
been included to determine the amount of child support. Another aspect that contributes to the
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literature is consideration of who files first. Emery (1994) discusses the theoretical implications
of who files while Farmer and Tiefenthaler (2001) empirically examines differences in who files
by including variables to indicate who wants out of divorce which does not show up to be
significant in determining the amount of child support awarded.
A few others have looked at the relationship between legal custody and child support, but
analyzing legal custody is not relevant because over 80% of the couples in my study have joint
legal custody due to the California’s emphasis on the continued involvement of both parents.
Papers such as Huang et al. (2004) use a joint determination approach that tests to see if joint
legal custody increases father involvement which is proxied by amount of support paid. My
paper focuses on the bargaining process that takes place when divorcing parents are negotiating
over the terms of divorce outcomes. The empirical approach which accounts for selection more
realistically represents the process parents undergo when making decisions concerning the child.
In the appendix I present various models that follow the previous literature in accounting for the
joint determination of custody and support and produce results that are in alignment with these
previous studies. I find empirical support for bargaining between custody and support, more
specifically that mothers trade child support in order to gain sole physical custody of their
children, which has not been examined thoroughly in the literature. By introducing these various
aspects that have not been examined in the framework of bargaining over physical custody and
child support, this paper helps fill gaps in the current literature on divorce proceedings.

DATA AND EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION
I use the Stanford Child Custody Study to test for tradeoffs between child custody and
child support for those families with mother sole physical custody and joint physical custody.
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The dataset consists of 1,124 couples that filed for divorce between September 1984 and April
1985. The families were from San Mateo and Santa Clara Counties in California. To be
included in the study, the family must have had a child that remains a minor throughout the
entire study. Interviews were conducted over a three year period focusing on the resolution of
divorce outcomes such as child custody, child support, visitation and the division of marital
property. The study contains detailed demographic, employment, and parenting information as
well as information about the legal issues surrounding their divorce. For a more detail
description of the data see Maccoby and Mnookin (1992).
This paper aims to gain insight into the informal bargaining process that occurs when
parents negotiate the terms of their divorce, with specific focus on tradeoffs between custody and
child support. As mentioned above when estimating equations of child custody and child
support, it is necessary to take into consideration their joint determination. Previous studies
mentioned above estimate the equations simultaneously, using two stage least squares, or with a
latent-class approach. In this paper I use a two-stage selection model to control from common
factors that influence both the custody allocation and the child support award. In the first stage
the probability that the mother receive sole physical custody of the children is estimated.
Because 82% of the mothers and only 29% of fathers in the sample stated their preferred custody
to be mother sole physical custody, it is possible to view the outcome of mother sole physical
custody as a “win” for the mother. In essence when estimating the custody equation, I am
estimating the probability that the mother achieves her preferred custody outcome. From the
probit model the selection term is generated to measure the correlation between the error terms in
the custody equation and the support equation. Next the child support equation is estimated
using the tobit method with the selection term included. Other model specifications are included
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in the Appendix for further comparison including estimates of the child support equation with
actual and predicted custody using the tobit method and two stage least squares.
Table 1 reports the mean and standard deviations for all variable used in the child custody
and child support equations.
Table 1
Summary Statistics
Mean
Child Support
Father Earnings
Father College
Mother Earnings

Standard Deviation

$357.05

$258.76

$35,959.68

$24,456.46

0.405
$12,428.69

0.491
$13,823.27

Mother College

0.268

0.444

Home

0.678

0.468

Overnights with Father

2.029

3.091

Children

1.589

0.661

Mother Custody

0.704

0.457

Mom Filed

0.642

0.480

91.953

114.556

Father End Quickly

6.419

2.923

Mother End Quickly

6.889

2.804

Father Lawyer

0.656

0.475

Mother Lawyer

0.781

0.414

Diff Sep File
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Father Involvement

7.791

2.094

Mother Involvement

8.737

1.911

Mediation

0.363

0.481

Different Custody Wants

0.564

0.496

The two dependent variables to be estimated are the custody outcome and child support
award. Child custody is represented by a dummy variable that is one if the mother receives sole
physical custody of the children and 0 if joint physical custody is awarded. As mentioned earlier
the variable “Mother Custody” also represents a “win” for the mother in terms of achieving the
physical custody she wanted. About 70% of the cases in the sample the mothers receive sole
physical custody of the children. The “Mother Custody” variable is also used in the estimation
of the child support award. Custody allocation or the time the child spends in each parents
household is one of the guidelines used when determining child support. Families in which the
mother has sole physical custody should have higher child support awards, compared to those
families with joint physical custody, because the child is spending the majority of their time in
the mother’s household who then faces a higher financial burden of care. The second equation
estimated is the child support award. Child support awards are reported in dollars per month.
The average award in the sample, including those with no support award, is $357 per month. For
those families with a child support award, the average award is $371 for the entire sample, $383
for those families with mother custody, and $332 for those families with joint physical custody.
A variable included in the analysis is “Different Custody Wants” which is a dummy
variable for if the parents reported a preference for opposing physical custody outcomes. The
dataset asks parents about the type of physical custody they would hope to achieve even if it was
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different than the physical custody they legal requested. I use this variable in my analysis to
represent the parents’ true preference for physical custody despite any bargaining or persuasion
that might take place between parents before filing. Maccoby and Mnookin (1992) take a
detailed look at custody preferences of the parents, regardless of the custody formally filed. In
82% of the cases, mothers requested the custody they preferred while only 56% of fathers acted
on their preferred custody. In 7% and 10% of the cases mothers and fathers respectively
requested more custody than they wanted. They suggest parents filing for more custody may be
behaving strategically in order to induce tradeoffs between custody and support.
When examining the difference between the parents’ preferred physical custody outcome
and the custody filed it is possible to see movement from disagreeing in terms of wants for
custody but filing the same custody allocation. This would indicate that the parents worked out
some portion of the divorce outcome before officially filing which gives rise to “bargaining in
the shadow of the law.” In the Stanford Child Custody dataset only 22% of the parents filed for
different physical custody outcomes while over 56% of the families reported conflicting custody
wants. The variable “Different Custody Wants” is anticipated to have a negative impact on the
probability of mother sole physical custody due to the legal environment in California at the time
of data collection. Estimation of the custody equation includes only those families with mother
sole physical custody and joint physical custody. At this time California had a favor for joint
custody with a goal of encouraging continued contact of the both parents with the children upon
divorce. Also when examining differences in child support, I find the average child support
award is $469 a month for those families who preferred and filed for the same physical custody
allocation, whereas, for those families that desired different custody outcomes but filed the same,
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average child support payments were only $323 a month indicating the presence of tradeoffs
between custody and support.
Another variable included in the child support equations is “Diff Sep File.” This variable
is the number of days between separation of the parents and filing for divorce and represents the
opportunity for greater communication and negotiation concerning the terms of the divorce
settlement before formally beginning the divorce process. “Diff Sep File” will capture any
bargaining that may have taken place before legal divorce proceedings officially begin. If
parents had different residential wants and ended up filing for different custody there were about
92 days between separating and filing for divorce. If parents had different residential wants and
ended up filing for the same physical custody there were about 119 days between separation and
filing for divorce. Parents in this second category represent those that had the opportunity to
bargain before the divorce process officially began. By looking at these different categories, I
hypothesis that “Diff Sep File” will have a negative impact on the amount of child support
awarded representing tradeoffs between child custody and child support.
Again to capture bargaining, I include the dummy variable “Mom File” which takes a
value of one if the mother files for divorce and 0 if the father files for divorce. Over 64% of the
divorce cases included in the analysis were filed for by mothers. Emery (1994) suggests when
mothers want out of the marriage custody issues are going to be at the forefront of the divorce
proceedings. Mothers then may feel that they must sacrifice in terms of support in order to get
their preferred custody outcome. Based on Emery’s discussion I hypothesize “Mom File” to
have a negative impact on the amount of child support awarded.
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Other variables included in the estimation to account for economic capability of the
parents are income and education of both parents along with a variable to indicate home
ownership. Fathers in the sample make on average about $36,000 a year while mothers only
make about $12,400 a year. About 40% and 37% of fathers and mothers respectively, have a
college degree. Home ownership is included to account for greater marital assets with about
68% of the sample indicating homeownership. Huang et al. (2003) suggests that parents with
higher education and income are “egalitarian” and more likely to file for joint custody. In terms
of custody, both the father and mother’s income would negatively affect the probability of
mother sole physical custody or in other words increase the probability of joint physical custody.
When discussing income it is necessary to differentiate between mother and father earnings to
take into consideration the ability to provide for the child with separate resources. Mother
earnings are anticipated to have a negative impact on child support award, whereas father income
and home ownership are predicted to positively affect support awards.
Additional variables included in the established child support guidelines are the number
of children and the number of overnights spent with the father in the past two weeks. The
number of children will increase the amount of child support due to resources required for
multiple children. Almost half of the couples in the sample have only one child. Overnights with
the father should decrease the amount of child support ordered because the child will be
spending more time with the father allowing him to cover more day-to-day expenses. On
average children spend two days with their father in a two week period.
Other variables included in the child custody equation are pre-separation involvement
measures of the mother and father. The involvement variables are measures on a scale from 1 to
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10 with 1 indicating “low involvement” and 10 indicating “high involvement.” Fathers report a
level of involvement of 7.8 while mothers report significantly greater involvement of an 8.73.
These variables are intended to capture the parents’ investment in the children. Based on the
theory of custody allocation (Rasul, 2006; Francesconi and Muthoo, 2003), if the investments of
the parents are relatively homogenous joint custody is optimal but if one parent has a
significantly greater investment in the children than the other, sole physical custody should be
granted to the parent with higher investment levels. In terms of physical custody, the likelihood
of mother sole custody would increases with mother involvement and decrease with father
involvement.
To account for the legal environment in which these couples are making decisions about
divorce outcomes, variables indicating the use of mediation and lawyers are included in the
custody and child support equations. In 1981 California enacted the policy of mandatory
mediation for parents undergoing custody disputes in order to minimize the amount of litigation
and encourage parents to establish a parenting agreement in line with the best interests of the
child. The dummy variable “Mediation” is a one if parents went to mediation at any time before
the divorce was final. About 36% of the families in this paper attended mediation. Some critics
suggest that mediators use joint custody as a default in order to resolve disputes without further
litigation, while Reynolds et al. (2007) using more recent data from North Carolina in a
mandatory mediation framework finds this claim to be unsubstantiated. I expect mediation to
have positive impact on the issuance of joint custody due to the time frame of data collection for
this paper and emphasis on joint custody in the California legal setting.
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A dummy variable indicating the use of lawyers for the mother and father are also
included in the custody and support equations. About 78% of the mothers and 66% of the fathers
hired lawyers to assist in divorce proceedings. Mnookin and Kornhauser (1979) discuss the role
of lawyers in the bargaining process. They suggest that lawyers help parents determine there
“bargaining chips” in the negotiation process. On one hand lawyers are a source of information
and can increase the probability that a negotiation occurs, while on the other increases
transactions costs and may lead to higher levels of dispute. In the custody equation, lawyers
should be aligned with the custody preferences of the parents. The use of lawyers by fathers
would decrease the probability of mother sole physical custody while mother use would increase
the probability of mothers achieving sole physical custody. For the child support equations the
use of lawyers is expected to increase the amount of support ordered.
“Father End Quickly” and “Mother End Quickly” are proxies for costs, both financial
costs and psychological costs, of the divorce process. The end quickly variables are on a 1 to 10
scale with 1 indicating that the parent is “trying to slow things down” and 10 indicating the
parent is “trying to end things quickly.” Mothers report a 6.89 on average while fathers report a
6.42. These variables are expected to have opposite effects on the amount of child support
awarded. If mothers desire for the divorce to end quickly they would be willing to sacrifice with
respect to the financial terms of the divorce in order to end the proceedings as quickly as
possible, whereas fathers would be willing to pay more in order to incur further costs through
continued disputes.
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RESULTS
The results from estimating the child custody equation using the probit method are
presented in Table 2. The coefficients are followed by the robust standard errors in parentheses.
Two models are reported with the second excluding variables indicating the use of lawyers due
to possible endogeneity of lawyer use between the mother and father. In both models the
analysis correctly classifies the appropriate custody allocation 72% of the cases.

Table 2
Probit Results from Estimation of the Custody Equation
Model 1
Father Earnings

Father College

Mother Earnings

-1.63e-06

-2.06e-06

(2.91e-06)

(2.87e-06)

-0.166

-0.133

(0.143)

(0.141)

-7.27e-06

-7.28e-06

(4.41e-06)
Mother College

Home

Father Involvement

Model 2

(4.34e-06)

-0.111

-0.114

(0.156)

(0.155)

-0.204

-0.219

(0.156)

(0.152)

-0.026

-0.032

(0.031)

(0.030)
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Mother Involvement

Children

Father Lawyer

-0.003

-0.006

(0.033)

(0.033)

0.183

0.167

(0.096)

(0.096)

-0.211
(0.157)

Mother Lawyer

-0.211
(0.169)

Mediation

Different Custody Wants

Constant

-0.374

-0.425

(0.134)**

(0.129)***

-0.484

-0.468

(0.133)***

(0.131)***

1.225
(0.442)**

1.376
(0.427)***

R2

0.082

0.079

𝐶

48.02***

44.70***

N

468

474

Notes: Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses
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Results of the custody equation suggest that the legal environment faced by divorcing
couples significantly impacts the allocation of physical custody. In California, the legal
framework consists of mandatory mediation and preference for joint custody. “Different
Custody Wants” significantly decreases the probability that mothers receive sole physical
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custody of the children as expected due to California’s emphasis on continued contact of fathers
with their children after divorce. As mentioned before over 80% of the mothers indicated a
preference for sole physical custody while about 44% of the fathers indicated father sole physical
custody and joint custody as their preferred custody outcome. This result suggests that when
fathers express interest in maintaining physical custody of their children whether through sole or
joint custody, the courts respond by increasing the custody share of the father. Mediation also
significantly decreases the probability of mother sole physical custody as anticipated.
Variables representing the financial well-being of the family including earnings,
education, and homeownership, all had the expected negative sign but only the mother’s earnings
significantly decreased the probability of mother sole physical custody or in other words increase
the probability of joint physical custody. Huang et al. (2003) suggests that parents with jobs and
higher earnings are more likely to have joint physical custody because these parents must
balance work and children and do not want to or may not be able to sacrifice time away from
their careers. Results from the custody estimation are consistent with these explanations,
especially the earnings of the mother.
The number of children significantly increases the probability that mothers receive sole
physical custody. This may be primarily due to the difficulty in executing joint physical custody
with multiple children. Involvement variables and lawyer indicators did not significantly impact
the allocation of child custody. When the custody equation is estimated without the variables for
lawyer representation, there are no significant differences in the results.
The results from estimating the child support equation using the tobit method while
controlling for selection are presented in Table 3. The coefficients are followed by the robust
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standard errors in parentheses. Again two models are reported with the second excluding
variables indicating the use of lawyers due to possible endogeneity of lawyer use between the
mother and father.

Table 3
Tobit Results from Estimation of the Child Support Equation

Father Earnings

Father College

Model 1

Model 2

0.005

0.005

(0.000)***

(0.001)***

95.464

95.624

(24.733)***
Mother Earnings

Mother College

Home

-0.002

-0.002

(0.000)***

(0.001)**

-1.613

-2.253

(27.216)

(27.377)

55.985

59.403

(21.514)**
Father Overnights

Children

Mother Custody

(24.084)***

(21.384)**

-7.940

-7.715

(3.688)**

(3.560)*

129.909

133.218

(17.627)***

(16.905)***

109.523

107.765

(26.767)***

(26.151)***
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Mom Filed

Diff Sep File

Father End Quickly

Mother End Quickly

Father Lawyer

-40.034

-26.948

(24.130)

(21.520)

-0.143

-0.169

(0.087)

(0.086)*

0.366

0.773

(3.181)

(3.124)

-5.850

-6.465

(3.697)

(3.653)

20.859
(23.359)

Mother Lawyer

42.055
(24.39)

Selection

Constant

-123.437

-89.629

(67.035)

(62.252)

-54.691

-34.987

(62.615)

(6.318)

R2

0.053

0.052

𝐶

17.15***

19.56***

N

425

Notes: Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses
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All of the guideline variables, such as father and mother income, father visitation, and
number of children, included in the estimation of the child support award are significant and
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have the expected signs. Father’s income and education significantly increase the amount of
child support awarded while the mother’s income has a significant negative impact as expected.
The mother’s education does not significantly impact the amount of support awarded. This result
could be due to the emphasis on the ability to financially provide for the child upon divorce,
because the amount of education of the mother indicates potential but not actual earnings.
Homeownership, included in the estimation to represent financial stability, significantly
increases the amount of child support awarded. The financial variables are included to account
for the ability to pay. As expected, child support significantly increases with the number of
children. The number of overnight visits with the father significantly decreases the amount of
child support awarded. When children spend more time with their father, the father is able to
cover more of the child’s expenses, decreasing the financial burden on the mother, subsequently
decreasing the amount of support needed.
“Mother Custody” significantly increases the amount of child support awarded. If
mothers have sole physical custody as opposed to joint physical custody, child support awards
will be higher due to the time spent in the mother’s household compared to split residence
between both the mother and the father as discussed above. Another variable that impacts the
amount of support ordered is the dummy variable indicating whether or not each parent
employed an attorney. The presence of a lawyer hired by the mother significantly increases the
amount of child support awarded, while the father’s representation does not. This result is in line
with the discussion provided by Mnookin and Kornhauser (1979) and the results of Seltzer
(1991).
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The variables “Mom filed” and “End Quickly” were included in the support equation to
account for the negotiation process that may take place between parents in order to be released
from the divorce proceedings and no longer incur both financial and psychological costs. The
dummy variable indicating the mother filed for divorce significantly decreases the amount of
child support awarded suggesting that mothers are willing to accept less child support when they
are the ones who want out of the marriage.

Neither “End Quickly” variable was significant

although their signs were as anticipated.
“Diff Sep File” was included in the child support equation to represent the opportunity
for bargaining between the mother and father over divorce outcomes. The more time between
the couple’s separation and filing for divorce indicates a chance for parents to make informal
negotiations before entering the formal divorce proceedings. In the child support equation, the
time between separation and filing for divorce significantly decreased the amount of child
custody to be awarded. These results relate to the discussion of the process families undergo
when moving from different custody wants to filing for the same type of custody by undergoing
tradeoffs between custody and support.
The selection term is negative and significant. This result suggests that the error terms
from the custody equation and support equation are negatively correlated which implies the
unobserved factors that lead to higher probabilities of mother sole physical custody are
associated with lower child support awards. This approach accounts for the joint determination
of child custody and child support. The negative relationship between the two equations,
represented by the significance of lambda, signifies that mothers who “win” there preferred
custody are making tradeoffs between support and custody.
110

CONCLUSION
This paper examines the concept of trade-offs between custody and child support in order to
secure their preferred custody outcome. Mnookin and Kornhauser (1979) introduce the concept
of “bargaining in the shadow of the law” which describes negotiations made between parents in
the framework of their existing legal setting. I use a two-stage estimation approach to account
for the joint determination of child custody and child support. I find that the legal environment
surrounding divorce proceedings significantly increase the likelihood of joint physical custody.
Results from the estimation of the child support equation suggest that along with the typical
guideline variables, the time between separation and filing for divorce and the mother filing for
divorce significantly decrease the support award while lawyer representation of the mother
significantly increases the amount of child support issued. After taking into consideration
selection, I find that the significant negative relationship between the custody and support
equations, accounted for in the selection term, signifies that mothers who “win” their preferred
custody are making tradeoffs between support and custody.
This paper provides empirical support that parents do in fact trade child support in order to
gain their preferred custody outcome, more specifically mothers trade child support in order to
gain sole physical custody of their children. These results indicate the need for a greater
understanding of the implications of the court’s preference for joint custody. In a legal
environment, such as California, which has a preference for joint custody, mothers may feel they
are under even more pressure to sacrifice financial support in order to overcome the courts desire
for joint physical custody, especially in situations where it may be to the detriment of the child.
It might be intuitive to think that the child support guidelines need to be more detailed with
greater enforcement in order to insure adequate financial support, but by doing so the bargaining
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chips and the ability of parents to negotiate would be taken away. To avoid negotiations that
would lead mothers to accept significantly lower child support awards to achieve their desired
custody outcome, it is necessary for the courts to separate the determination of custody and
support. Also by exerting a greater effort to elicit the parents’ true preferences for custody in the
first stage of proceedings concerning child custody, parents would no longer be able to overstate
their preferences for custody in attempts to lower the amount of support awarded in the second
stage when determining the child support award.
Further work would include spousal support and the division of marital assets so that total
support could be analyzed. This would allow for a more complex bargaining framework. This
paper studies the amount of child custody awarded, although understanding the compliance rates
and actual payments would present a more accurate representation of the financial situation of
divorcing couples and their children. Another extension of the paper is to expand and replicate
the analysis using data from various states to see if tradeoffs between custody and support still
persist when under a different legal frameworks.
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APPENDIX

Table A1
Tobit Results from Estimation of the Child Support Equation

Father Earnings

Observed Mother

Predicted Mother

Custody

Custody

0.004
(0.001)***

Father College

75.648
(21.915)***

Mother Earnings

Mother College

Home

Mother Custody

Diff Sep File

Father End Quickly

(25.879)***

(0.001)**

(0.001)**

-22.631

4.523

(25.037)

(27.894)

65.536

56.612

-5.953

(22.166)**
-10.673
(3.957)**

143.622

125.529

(13.638)***

(17.453)***

129.176

308.44

(23.878)***
Mom Filed

102.271

-0.002

(3.253)
Children

(0.001)***

-0.002

(19.836)***
Father Overnights

0.005

(100.363)**

-11.849

-30.124

(22.157)

(24.753)

-0.275

-0.182

(0.099)

(0.089)*

0.189

0.417

(2.677)

(3.272)
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Mother End Quickly

Father Lawyer

Mother Lawyer

Constant

-7.429

-5.245

(3.229)**

(3.625)

-1.703

22.164

(19.888)

(23.935)

41.332

36.223

(21.463)

(25.670)

-130.492

-242.147

(53.315)**

(90.127)**

R

0.053

0.035

𝐶

22.08***

12.75***

2

N

562

447
5,

Notes: Robust Standard Errors are in Parentheses

Table A2
OLS Results from Estimation of the Child Support Equation

Father Earnings

Observed Mother

Predicted Mother

Custody

Custody

0.004
(0.001)***

Father College

77.093
(20.022)***

Mother Earnings

Mother College

Home

0.005
(0.001)***
102.237
(23.414)***

-0.002

-0.002

(0.001)***

(0.001)**

-17.074

4.837

(22.805)

(26.235)

55.337

49.883

(17.759)**
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(19.796)**

Father Overnights

Children

Mother Custody

Mom Filed

Diff Sep File

Father End Quickly

Mother End Quickly

Father Lawyer

Mother Lawyer

Constant

-5.208

-8.994

(2.850)

(3.344)***

137.869

122.359

(13.211)***

(16.894)***

103.727

274.536

(20.427)***

(92.868)**

-14.173

-32.488

(20.250)

(22.771)

-0.032

-0.167

(0.095)

(0.081)*

-0.330

-0.039

(2.415)

(3.063)

-6.134

-4.170

(3.013)*

(3.447)

-6.543

16.289

(18.156)

(22.170)

33.485

34.342

(18.710)

(22.47)

-77.415

-196.901

(48.177)

(83.848)*

R2

0.508

0.482

F

23.69***

17.10***

N

562

Notes: Robust Standard Errors are in Parentheses
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CONCLUSION

The results of the first essay indicate that licensed child care centers with the Better
Beginnings rating charge significantly higher prices once the highest levels of certification are
obtained, relative to those not participating in the quality certification program. The main
contribution of this paper is the verification of the value of information available to parents
through the use of the Quality Rating and Improvement System. These results provide support
for policy that makes child care characteristics easily observable which will help in reducing the
information asymmetry between parents and child care providers by making more information
available to parents increasing the incentive for child care providers to deliver high quality care
in order to remain competitive in an ever growing market.
The second essay uses the Stanford Child Custody data set to estimate the determinants
of using the courts to settle child custody disputes and provides some support for the notion that
the use of the courts is more likely when the resource in dispute is indivisible. The results show
that higher levels of hostility increase the likelihood of going to court. In addition, these results
support the prediction that wealth constraints, such as owning a home, over which the couple can
bargain lowers the likelihood of going to court. This paper provides some initial support for
Shavell’s (1993) proposition that the indivisibility of the resource under dispute may explain
why some cases go to court instead of settle, as predicted by most of the theoretical literature.
In the third essay I find that the legal environment surrounding divorce proceedings,
including aspects such as mandatory mediation along with a preference for joint custody,
significantly increases the likelihood of joint physical custody. Results from the estimation of
the child support equation suggest that along with the typical guideline variables such as income
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of the parents, number of the children, and visitation, the time between separation and filing for
divorce and the mother filing for divorce significantly decreases the support award while lawyer
representation of the mother significantly increases the amount of child support issued. Using a
selection model, I find that the significant negative relationship between the custody and support
equations, accounted for in the selection term, signifies that mothers who “win” their preferred
custody are making tradeoffs between support and custody. These results indicate the need for a
greater understanding of the implications of the court’s preference for joint custody. In a legal
environment, such as California, which has a preference for joint custody, mothers may feel they
are under even more pressure to sacrifice financial support in order to overcome the courts desire
for joint physical custody, especially in situations where it may be to the detriment of the child.
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